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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring 
for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster 
Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or 
email monitor2@icblcmc.org.
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes an effort to limit the environmental 
footprint of reports by publishing all of our research reports online. This report is 
available online. 
Detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org/cp 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, 
stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing 
mined areas, and assisting affected communities.
The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation 
by all, including:
  No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel 
landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
  Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
  More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW);
  Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.







LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict. 
Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person. This includes improvised explosive devices (IEDs), also known as 
improvised landmines, with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines 
are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as 
opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers 
the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict 
against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.
ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason 
fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive 
items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. 
Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used 
during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. 
ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster 
munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, 
but not mines. 
Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons 
can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and 
surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their 
daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom 
of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. 
These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in 
mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When 
land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to 
landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than 
paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, 
but that they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.
ii 
There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban 
Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for 
governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel 
mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and 
transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their 
jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so 
must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families 
and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine 
incidents. 
This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments 
to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations. 
The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition 
(CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely 
without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded 
submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines 
or ERW presence for decades to come.
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES 
The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and 
internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize 
jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about 
the Mine Ban Treaty.
The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of 
working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines. 
The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, 
Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human 
Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations 
witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with 
in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even 
prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive 
solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a 
complete ban on antipersonnel mines.
The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience 
of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors 
they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and 
medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who 
spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty 
banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized 
conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine 
problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them 
to be effective advocates in their respective countries.   
Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage 
their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today 
there are campaigns in some 100 countries. 
The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. 
It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty 
became a reality. 
Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days 
of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel 






mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join 
the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the 
campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, 
a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration.
The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries 
who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state 
armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty. 
Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, 
which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This 
includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all 
aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim 
assistance.
The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message 
and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective 
partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.
In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become 
the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.
LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and 
the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the 
Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States 
Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response 
to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together 
in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament 
treaties and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into 
practice the concept of civil society-based verification.
In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine 
Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, 
the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition 
issue. Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and 
Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-
CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate 
publications.
The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is 
an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have 
taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through 
extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although 
in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send 
researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.
Monitor reporting complements the transparency reporting by states required under 
international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual 
collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, 
cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for 
independent reporting and evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and 
ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, 
cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information 
about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.
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The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network 
of more than 30 researchers and a 13-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare 
this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from 
other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.
Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.
As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is 
limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that 
is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections 
from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search 
for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.
ABOUT THIS REPORT
This is the 18th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster 
Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2016 provides 
a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries 
and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp. 
Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling, and also 
includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support 
for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2015, with information included up to 
November 2016 when possible.







A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It 
was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support 
of a significant number of donors.
Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The 
Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank 
the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, 
and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC 
staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, 
distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.
Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research 
Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of four NGOs 
as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s members 
include: DanChurchAid (Richard MacCormac), Handicap International (Alma Taslidžan Al-
Osta), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren 
Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team coordinator), Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC 
government liaison and policy manager), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). 
Megan Burke (ICBL-CMC director) is an ex-officio member. From January to November 2016, 
the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced 
thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2016. The Editorial Team included:
  Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Marta Kosmyna, Yeshua Moser-
Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham, with assistance from Christopher Diamond.
  Contamination, clearance, and support for mine action: Jennifer Reeves, Amelie 
Chayer, and Marion Loddo; and
  Casualties and victim assistance: Loren Persi Vicentic, Erin Hunt, Clémence 
Caraux-Pelletan, Marie-Josée Hamel, Michael Moore, and Marianne Schulze.
The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review 
supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid, which conducted mine action research 
in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented 
online and in its print publications. 
 Jeff Abramson of ICBL-CMC provided final editing in October and November 2016 with 
assistance from Morgan McKenna (publications consultant). 
Report formatting was undertaken by Lixar I.T. Inc. B & B Impresores printed the report in 
Chile. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors*. 
  Government of Australia
  Government of Austria
  Government of Belgium
  Government of France
  Government of Germany
  Government of New Zealand
  Government of Norway
  Government of Sweden
  Government of Switzerland
  Holy See 
  UNICEF
  UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, 
the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the 
organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating 
organizations.
* List accurate as of November 2016.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AXO abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC battle area clearance
CCW 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA confirmed hazardous area
CMC Cluster Munition Coalition
ERW explosive remnants of war
EU European Union
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI Handicap International
ICBL International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IED improvised explosive device
IMAS International Mine Action Standards
ISU Implementation Support Unit
NGO non-governmental organization
NSAG non-state armed group
SHA suspected hazardous area
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA United Nations General Assembly

























Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an 
armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and 
which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under 
the broader category of explosive remnants of war.
Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty 
through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification. 
Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and 
ratification, or through accession.
“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level 
of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or 
suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment 
of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results 
expected.
Antihandling device – Ac      to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means 
a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or 
placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or 
otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”
Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means 
a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and 
that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine 
designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed 
to a person.”
Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected 
hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates 
that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine 
clearance tools.
Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine 
clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining 
equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected 
hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed 
not to be mined, can be released.
Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas 
where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.
Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through 
direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.
Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine 
and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all 
specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.
Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster 
munition is a“conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive 
submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” 
Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground 
or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. 
Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both. 
Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination 
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has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, 
including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land. 
Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned 
explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.
Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, 
recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.
Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner 
incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) 
may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned 
under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not. 
Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – 
An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.
International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety 
and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some 
cases, defining international requirements and specifications.
Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and 
remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk 
involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-
technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of 
land with actual mine/ERW contamination.
Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, 
normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action 
centers also implement mine action activities.
Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines 
and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public 
information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.
Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups 
include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader 
range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.
Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical 
interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of 
mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is 
present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-
making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities 
typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central 
institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area. 
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW 
contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous 
area.
Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk 
remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy 
all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.
Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition 
(cluster munition). 
Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, 
submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.
Suspected hazardous area – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW 






















Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical 
interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of 
mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is 
present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-
making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may 
include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface 
search.
Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as 
intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.
Unexploded ordnance – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were 
designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate. 
Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her 
family, and community.
Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and 
needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public 
policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their 
families, and communities in society.
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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production  
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
Table Key
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Landmine Monitor 2016 continues to detail progress toward the goal of a mine-free world, 
but also reports a decade-high number of casualties at a time when support for mine action 
fell to its lowest levels in 10 years. Rejection of antipersonnel mines remains the global 
norm even as non-state armed groups and a small number of states not party to the Mine 
Ban Treaty use the weapons. Many countries continue to clear mine contamination, however 
global clearance declined in 2015 and very few States Parties appear to be on track to meet 
clearance deadlines. 
TREATY STATUS
There are 162 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and one signatory—Marshall Islands—
that has yet to ratify.
  There were no new ratifications or accessions in the reporting period. The last 
country to accede was Oman in August 2014.
  In March 2016, it was announced that Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers had approved 
accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, but the instrument of accession had not been 
deposited as of 1 November 2016.
USE
The use of antipersonnel mines by states remains a relatively rare phenomenon. 
  There was no confirmed new use of the weapons by States Parties from October 
2015 through October 2016.
  The government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria—all states not party to 
the Mine Ban Treaty—again used antipersonnel landmines in the past year. 
Over the past year, non-state armed groups have used antipersonnel landmines in 10 
countries: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and 
Yemen. 
  Non-state armed groups mostly used improvised mines, also known as victim-
activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and booby traps—rather than factory-
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made landmines. Such devices are banned by the Mine Ban Treaty as they explode 
due to the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. The Monitor recorded but could 
not independently verify allegations of new mine use in States Parties Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger, Philippines, and Tunisia, or in states not party Iran and Saudi Arabia.
CASUALTIES
In 2015, there was a sharp rise in the number of people killed and injured by mines, victim-
activated IEDs that mostly act as antipersonnel mines (also called improvised mines), cluster 
munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).
  In 2015, the Monitor recorded 6,461 mine/ERW casualties, of which at least 1,672 
people were killed, marking a 75% increase from casualties recorded for 2014. A 
revised total of 3,695 casualties was recorded in 2014.
  The sharp increase in casualties in 2015 was due to more casualties recorded in 
armed conflicts in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. The increase also reflects greater 
availability of casualty data, particularly from unique systematic surveys of persons 
injured in Libya and Syria in 2015.
  The casualty total in 2015 marked the most annual recorded casualties since 2006.
  2015 also marked the highest number of annual casualties by improvised mines 
recorded by the Monitor.
Casualties were identified in 56 states and five other areas in 2015, of which 37 are States 
Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
  The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (78%) where 
their status was known, which is similar to the past two years.
  In 2015, children accounted for 38% of all civilian casualties where the age was 
known.
  Women and girls made up 14% of all casualties where the sex was known, a slight 
increase compared to recent years.
  Some 60% of recorded global casualties occurred in States Parties, down from 70% 
in 2014.
  The Monitor has recorded more than 100,000 mine/ERW casualties for the period 
since its global tracking in began in 1999, including some 73,000 new survivors.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$471.3 million in international and 
national support for mine action in 2015, a decrease of $139 million (23%) from 2014, the 
third year in a row of declining support, and lowest level since 2005.
Thirty-five donors contributed $340.1 million in international support for mine action to 41 
states and three other areas. This represents a decrease of almost $77 million from 2014, 
and the first time since 2005 that international support fell below $400 million.
  The top five mine action donors—the United States, Japan, the European Union (EU), 
Norway, and the Netherlands—contributed 71% of all international funding, with a 
combined total of $240 million.
  Thirteen donors decreased their funding in 2015, with the EU and Norway accounting 
for $57 million (74%) of the global decline.
  The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Syria—
received $161.9 million, or 48% of all international support in 2015.
  Afghanistan received more funding than any other country for the thirteenth 
consecutive year.
  In 2016, donors hosted three international pledging conferences, during which 











implementation support unit. While this was an unprecedented number of events 
of this kind, it is not yet possible to determine how these conferences will impact 
overall support for mine action in 2016 and future years.
Fourteen affected states reported providing $131.2 million in national support for their own 
mine action programs, a decrease of $62 million compared with 2014. 
CONTAMINATION AND CLEARANCE
Sixty-four states and areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of October 2016. 
  This includes 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 24 states not party, and four 
other areas. This is an increase from 61 states and areas in 2015. 
  The increase is due to new use of antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines, 
in Nigeria, and to the acquisition of new data on pre-existing contamination in Palau 
and Mozambique.
  Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 100 km2 total per country) 
is believed to exist in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and in the area of Western Sahara.
About 171 km2 of land was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2015, a decrease from an 
estimated 201 km2 in 2014. 
  In 2015, nearly 158,000 antipersonnel mines and some 14,000 antivehicle mines 
were destroyed in the context of mine clearance.
  As in 2014, the largest total clearance of mined areas in 2015 was achieved in 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted for more than 70% of 
recorded clearance.
  It is not possible to attribute the 2015 decrease in clearance to a single cause, but the 
severe reduction in funding available for mine action probably played a major role. 
  Over the past five years, approximately 960 km2 of mined areas have been cleared. 
Some 1.3 million antipersonnel and more than 66,000 antivehicle mines have been 
destroyed in the context of mine clearance.
Twenty-six States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance of 
all mined areas on their territory since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.
  One state, Ukraine, is in violation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty due to missing 
its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline without being granted an extension.
  Five States Parties were granted extended clearance deadlines at the Fourteenth 
Meeting of States Parties in 2015: Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. 
Two States Parties requested deadline extensions in 2016, awaiting approval at the 
Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties: Niger and Peru.
  Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their treaty-mandated 
clearance deadlines: Algeria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ecuador.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
Most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine victims suffered 
from a lack of adequate resources to fulfill the commitments of the 2014–2019 Maputo Action 
Plan. Findings below relate to the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims.
  Localized surveys to improve understanding of the needs of mine victims continued 
in most States Parties.
  Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms or 
relevant national plans in place to advance efforts to assist mine victims and uphold 
their rights. However, victim assistance plans expired in Burundi, Croatia, Senegal, and 
Uganda without having been revised or renewed in 2015, while expired action plans 
for assistance in Afghanistan and Sudan have not yet been updated since 2011. 
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  In most States Parties, assistance efforts have been integrated into other disability 
rights and development efforts, through collaborative coordination, combined 
planning, and survivor participation. Unfortunately, such integration has not resulted 
in mobilizing the funding and resources required to fill the growing gap between 
assistance available and the obligations that states have to victims.
  In nearly all the States Parties, survivors were joining in coordination processes 
that affect their lives, although in many countries their participation must be better 
supported, especially in decision-making roles. Many States Parties still need to 
demonstrate that they are doing their utmost to increase survivors’ participation in 
all relevant matters.
  More than half of the States Parties included some information on victim assistance 
activities and progress in their transparency reports covering calendar year 
2015. However, the States Parties still needed to start reporting concretely on time-
bound and measurable objectives and progress toward victim assistance goals.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 51 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 2.1 million destroyed in 2015. 
Four States Parties possess more than seven million antipersonnel mines remaining to be 
destroyed: Ukraine (5.4 million), Belarus (1.5 million), Greece (643,265), and Oman (15,734). 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Greece all missed their treaty-mandated destruction deadlines.
  The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban 
Treaty stockpile landmines. In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states 
not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global 
total may be less than 50 million.
TRANSFER AND PRODUCTION 
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the 
previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Vietnam. 
  Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but reserve 
the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, 
Pakistan, and South Korea.
  Non-state armed groups in countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria make antipersonnel mines, including victim-
activated IEDs (improvised mines).
A de facto global ban on the state-to-state transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect 
since the mid-1990s. 
  Use of factory-produced antipersonnel mines in States Parties Yemen and Ukraine, 
where declared stockpiles had been destroyed, indicates that some illicit transfers 
have occurred either internally among actors or from sources external to the country
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
As of 15 October 2016, only 45% of States Parties had submitted their required annual 
transparency reports for calendar year 2015, a slight increase from the previous year (41%). 











Writing on the wall in the yard of the main hospital in Manbij, Syria, warning of the presence  
of mines.










October 2016 marked 20 years since Canada’s then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy 
challenged states to negotiate and sign an instrument banning antipersonnel landmines 
by the end of 1997. After a whirlwind process that forged a new model of citizen diplomacy, 
the Mine Ban Treaty opened for signature on 3 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 
March 1999. 
The Mine Ban Treaty now has 162 States Parties. It provides the framework for eradicating 
antipersonnel landmines through its comprehensive prohibitions and requirements that 
States Parties clear mined areas within 10 years, destroy stockpiles within four years, and 
provide victim assistance. 
The Mine Ban Treaty has created a humanitarian disarmament standard that other 
instruments have followed, particularly its sister instrument the 2008 Convention on Cluster 
Munitions. However, Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are being tested by new use of the 
weapon and a significant rise in casualties. 
Over the past year, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used antipersonnel landmines 
in 10 countries.1 The new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in conflicts in Ukraine 
and Yemen and continued large-scale use of victim-activated improvised mines across 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries is particularly disturbing. These victim-activated 
mines are often referred to as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps. If they can 
be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, they meet the definition of an 
antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty, and therefore are banned.2
1 See below for details on use in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, 
Ukraine, and Yemen.
2 An antipersonnel mine is a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons. A mine is a munition designed to 
be placed under or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a person or vehicle. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 2. See the Casualties and Victim Assistance 
chapter for further definitional clarifications.
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Yet mine-laying by states remains a relatively rare phenomenon, with use only by the 
government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria in the past year. 
States Parties are steadily implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. Most of the 35 nations that 
remain outside of the treaty also abide by its key provisions despite not acceding. 
Several States Parties are still facing serious compliance issues, particularly with respect 
to missed stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated mine clearance deadline extensions.3 
However, governments and international organizations—such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)—continue 
to work together to support those facing challenges. Since its creation in 2014, the Mine Ban 
Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance has diligently followed up on allegations of 
landmine use by States Parties.
USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINES
In this reporting period—October 2015 through 
October 2016—Landmine Monitor has confirmed new 
use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces 
of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria, and by NSAGs in 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.4 Additionally, 
Landmine Monitor has also recorded but has been 
unable to confirm allegations of new mine use by 
NSAGs in Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Niger, Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, and Tunisia. 
In the reporting period, there were also reports of 
NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Kenya, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, 
Ukraine, and Yemen.
USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 
The use of victim-activated improvised mines continued in Afghanistan by armed groups, 
mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, that oppose the government. 
The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-government forces 
used victim-activated improvised mines in decreasing numbers during early 2016. Victim-
activated (pressure plate) improvised mines were responsible for almost half of all casualties 
recorded from IEDs during the first half of 2016, down 17% from 2015.5
3 For details on extension requests, please see the Contamination and Clearance chapter.
4 NSAGs used mines in at least 10 countries in 2014–2015, seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries 
in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries 
in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. NSAGs often use improvised mines, rather than factory-made 
antipersonnel mines. 
5 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2016 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, September 
2016, pp. 49–50, bit.ly/UNAMA2016midyear. Although overall casualty numbers decreased, pressure-
plate IEDs caused 48% of civilian casualties from IEDs in the first half of 2016 compared to 46% in the 
first half of 2015.
Locations of antipersonnel mine 
use, including victim-activated IEDs 






























Every year since 1999, Landmine Monitor has reported new mine use by armed opposition 
groups, mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), but new use of victim-activated devices appears to 
have dropped dramatically beginning in the second half of 2015 and through 2016. The 
2016 peace accord, narrowly rejected by voters in October 2016, requires the FARC to cease 
all armed conflict, demobilize, and turn in all weapons, including mines and components. 
Previously, in March 2015, the peace talks agreed to begin limited joint clearance activities 
as a confidence-building measure.6 That agreement did not require the FARC to halt new use 
or production, although FARC did pledge not to re-lay mines in any areas cleared.
In this reporting period (October 2015 through October 2016), the Monitor found no 
evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines by the FARC, including no use of victim-activated 
IEDs (improvised mines).  A review of media reporting during the period found two incidents 
of new mine use that were attributed to the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-
Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and two more incidents blamed on “criminals.”7
The Colombian army attributed one mine incident in Santander department in August 
2015 to the Capt. Paremino Company of the ELN. In October 2015, media reported that the 
ELN allegedly planted explosive devices near the bodies of dead soldiers.8
Iraq
Forces of the so-called Islamic State (IS, also called ISIS or ISIL) fighting the government 
of Iraq have used victim-activated improvised mines, including explosive booby-traps, 
extensively since 2014.9 Numerous media reports in 2015 and 2016 suggest widespread 
use of victim-activated devices by IS forces continues unabated.10 Iraq stated in its annual 
transparency report for 2015 that the large IS-controlled areas in Nineveh and Al Anbar, and 
parts of Babil and Diyala, governorates are where they are “planting landmines, booby traps, 
and explosives devices.”11 On 23 October 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that 
casualties among people fleeing the fighting during the government campaign on Mosul 
were caused by victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines).12
6 Acuerdo sobre limpieza y descontaminación del territorio de la presencia de minas antipersonal (MAP), 
artefactos explosivos improvisados (AEI) y municiones sin explotar (MUSE) o restos explosivos de guerra 
(REG) en general. Comunicado conjunto #52 entre el Gobierno colombiano y la guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), La Habana, 7 March 2015, www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/
comunicados/comunicado-conjunto-52-la-habana-7-de-marzo-de-2015.
7 July 2015–July 2016 media tracking in Colombia by Camilo Serna, Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas 
(CCCM), 12 July 2016. Media database of new use, unknown use, and seizures. The database contained 
149 incidents. Seventy-nine were attributed to the FARC, 36 to the ELN, one to Los Urabenos, and 33 
unattributable. Reports were collected from the following Colombian media sources: El Tiempo, Meridiano, 
Ejército Nacional, RCN Radio, Caracol Radio, Radio Santa Fe, El País, El Espectador, El Pais, La FM, El Heraldo, 
La Voz del Cinaruco, La Nación, Pasto Extra, HSB Noticias, and Vanguardia.
8 Ibid.
9 See for example, “ISIS’s latest threat: laying landmines,” IRIN, 6 November 2014, www.irinnews.org/
report/100797/isis-s-latest-threat-laying-landmines; and Mike Giglio, “The Hidden Enemy in Iraq,” 
Buzzfeed, 19 March 2015, www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/the-hidden-enemy-in-iraq#.inr8zj66W.
10 “ISIL landmines: Iraq tells civilians to avoid Ramadi,” Al Jazeera, 24 April 2016, www.aljazeera.com/
news/2016/04/civilians-warned-returning-iraq-ramadi-160424150550375.html; and Sophia Jones, 
“Civilians Risk Landmines And Snipers To Flee Fallujah As U.S.-Backed Iraqi Fighters Battle ISIS,” Huffington 
Post, 26 May 2016, bit.ly/fallujah26May2016.
11 Iraq, Article 7 Report for calendar year 2015 (in Arabic), cover letter, p. 2, bit.ly/Iraq2015Art7.
12 “Mohammed” told HRW that to leave Hawija, his family paid smugglers US$500 to avoid the explosive 
devices that IS had planted surrounding the city. The smugglers charged $250 each for him and his wife, 
and nothing for their two children. He said that as they walked through the mine-infested area, “we saw at 
least three bodies on the ground, killed by mines.” Brahan Hussein, who was part of the same group and had 
paid the same price to smugglers, said that he saw at least two dead children and a woman on the ground 
and presumed they had been killed by mines. HRW, “Iraq: ISIS Endangering Civilians in Mosul and Hawija,” 
23 October 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/23/iraq-isis-endangering-civilians-mosul-and-hawija.
10 
The scale and complexity of IS’s use of improvised mines, including booby-traps, has 
been the subject of many media reports. According to Lt. Gen. Michael Shields, the director 
of the United State (US) Joint IED Defeat Organization, “ISIL does an incredible job of booby-
trapping urban terrain as either they are still fighting in it or departing it, as has been proven 
in Fallujah and other places.”13 During a January 2016 operational update from Baghdad, 
Army Colonel Steve Warren said that while clearing Ramadi is progressing, it’s “slow and it’s 
painstaking” because clearance teams have “literally found thousands of booby-traps, IEDs, 
buried explosives [and] houses rigged to explode with a single trip-wire.”14 According to 
Zwer Mohammed, an officer from the Peshmerga bomb disposal teams in Kirkuk, “Since the 
beginning of the ISIS war in 2014, we have defused 10,000 bombs and booby traps left by 
ISIS. We defuse around 100 bombs on a daily basis in the liberated areas.”15
Nigeria
Boko Haram militants have allegedly been laying unspecified types of landmines in Nigeria 
since mid-2014. A technical expert working for the Norwegian Refugee Council provided the 
Monitor with photographs and technical characteristics of victim-activated IEDs made by 
Boko Haram that are triggered by a pressure plate. He said Al Shabaab in Somalia may have 
shared its technical knowledge in making such devices with Boko Haram.16
In August 2015, Colonel Sani Usman, the spokesperson of the Nigerian Army, reportedly 
stated that the army cleared landmines planted by Boko Haram from a major road in Borno 
state. He said that after the militants seized the town, they converted chemistry laboratories 
at the Dikwa School of Agriculture into bomb-making factories.17 The Nigerian Army released 
a series of photos showing its engineers removing improvised mines planted along the 
Gwoza-Yamteke highway.18 In August 2016, Nigerian media reported that the army was 
clearing Boko Haram-laid landmines in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states.19
Ukraine
Since 2014, the government of Ukraine stated that it had not used antipersonnel landmines 
in the conflict and accused Russian forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.20 In December 
2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the 
“Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, 
such as volunteer battalions.21
13 Patrick Tucker, “The Apps They Carried: Software, Big Data, and the Fight for Mosul,” Defense One, 17 
October 2016, www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/10/apps-they-carried-software-big-data-and-
fight-mosul/132409/?oref=d-channeltop.
14 US Department of Defense, “Clearing Ramadi Progresses Despite Obstacles, Inherent Resolve Official 
Says,” 20 January 2016, www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/643727/clearing-ramadi-progresses-
despite-obstacles-inherent-resolve-official-says.
15 “Peshmerga experts have defused 10,000 ISIS bombs, booby traps in two years,” Rudaw (Kirkuk), 1 
September 2016, rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/01092016.
16 Email exchange with Manuel Gonzal, Security Advisor, Norwegian Refugee Council – Nigeria, 7 March 2016.
17 “Nigerian Army Disables Boko Haram Explosives,” Voice of America, 5 August 2015, www.voanews.com/
content/nigeria-army-disables-boko-haram-explosives/2903551.html. 
18 “Bombs, IEDS & Land Mines: Nigeria Army Clear Gwoza -Yamteke Road in Borno (Photos),” Tori.ng, 5 August 
2015, www.tori.ng/news/5950/bombs-ieds-land-mines-nigeria-army-clear-gwoza-yam.html.
19 Duku Joel Maiduguri, “Military receives equipment to clear Boko Haram landmines in Northeast,” The 
Nation, 20 August 2016, http://thenationonlineng.net/military-receives-equipment-clear-boko-haram-
landmines-northeast/.
20 Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 June 2014, 
www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf; and statement 
of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, 
bit.ly/Ukraine26June2015.
21 The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled 
KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-
1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but 








In February 2016, Ukraine informed the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative 
Compliance that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-detonate mode, 
which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate 
mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.”22
Ukrainian civilian and military officials have accused separatist NSAGs of using 
antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines. At the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth 
Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, Ukraine stated that there were mined areas in 
territory under its jurisdiction but not under its control. In addition to those areas, it said that 
“sabotage acts are carried out on its territory which is under the control of Ukraine, including 
mining territory and infrastructure.”23
In November 2015, an officer from the General Staff informed soldiers that separatist 
NSAGs were using landmines attached to fish hooks and fishing lines to snag the clothing 
of soldiers as they moved through wooded areas, thereby detonating nearby mines.24 In May 
2016, two Ukrainian army engineers in Donetsk region were injured by an improvised mine 
as they were checking the area for explosives.25
In September 2016, Ukraine’s Department of Defense Intelligence reported that pro-
Russian separatists had laid POM-2 antipersonnel mines.26 Later that month, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to 
Ukraine reported the presence of antivehicle and 
antipersonnel mines that it said were preventing the 
SMM representatives from traveling from Pervomaisk 
toward Zolote, between Mykolaiv province and 
Luhansk province.27
Yemen
HRW has reported numerous instances of antipersonnel 
mine use by Ansar Allah, also called Houthis, and their 
allied forces loyal to former President Ali Abduallah 
Saleh in 2015 and 2016. Another NSAG, Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula, also appears to be using 
antipersonnel mines. 
Areas in and near the city of Taizz in Taizz 
governorate that Houthis and allied forces occupied 
from March 2015 until March 2016 were subsequently 
discovered to have been mined, including with PPM-
2 mines manufactured in the former East Germany.28 
Houthi officials denied using antipersonnel mines in 
22 “Report and Preliminary Observations Committee on Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Chile, Peru 
and Sweden), 2016 Intersessional Meetings,” May 2016, p. 4, bit.ly/MBTComplianceMay2016.
23 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015, 
bit.ly/UkraineMBT1Dec2015.
24 “General Staff: Militants use fishhooks to undermine mines,” Pravda (Moscow), 30 November 2015, www.
pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2015/11/30/7090705/. 
25 “In the past day, three soldiers were killed and two wounded,” Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Kiev, 5 May 2016, 
http://uacrisis.org/ua/42788-oleksandr-motuzyanik-91. 
26 “Most militant attacks – in Mariupol direction – Col. Andriy Lysenko,” Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Kiev, 
September 2016, http://uacrisis.org/ua/46719-lisenko-20.
27 “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 
19:30, 26 September 2016,” OSCE SMM to Ukraine, Kiev, 27 September, 2016, www.osce.org/ukraine-
smm/268961.
28 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims,” 8 September 2016, www.hrw.org/
news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims.
GYATA-64 antipersonnel mines recovered by deminers 
near Aden, Yemen.
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Taizz.29 A September response by Yemen’s foreign ministry 
affirmed Yemen’s commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty 
and said that when the conflict ends a committee will be 
created to investigate the landmine use in Taizz.30
In November 2015, HRW reported numerous casualties 
from landmines, including PPM-2 and Hungarian-made 
GYATA-64 antipersonnel mines that Houthi forces laid 
before retreating from Abyan governorate and Aden 
governorate in July 2015.31 New use of landmines by Houthi 
forces was also reported in Marib and Lahj governorates, 
but the areas remain inaccessible to independent 
researchers. 
In September 2015, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Cooperative 
Compliance Committee requested to meet with Yemen to 
discuss continuing mine use. According to the committee’s 
report, Yemen replied that due to the difficult circumstances 
faced by the government “it is not able to conduct an 
investigation for the moment on these new allegations 
and that due to the lack of adequate information it was 
unable to attend the meeting.”32
Officials reported in May 2016 that large stocks of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines 
had been recovered from the port city of Mukalla in Hadramout governorate that were 
allegedly used by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula until it was forced out in April 2016. 
The governor of Hadramout told a regional media outlet that Al-Qaeda forces extensively 
mined the Dhabah oil terminal.33
There has been no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition 
have used landmines in their military operations in Yemen. 
USE BY AND IN STATES NOT PARTY
Libya
There have been some indications that improvised landmines and other devices are being 
used in Libya, particularly in Sirte. Further evidence of landmine use has likely gone 
unrecorded due to a lack of media and independent reporting from the ground.
29 Officials at the Ministry of Human Rights in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and Saleh’s General People’s 
Congress party, told HRW in late July that the Houthis and allied forces did not use antipersonnel mines. 
An official with the office of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, a Houthi body, said in early August 
that the group did not plant antipersonnel mines in the city of Taizz. He acknowledged Houthi use of 
antivehicle mines, but said the use was “in military areas” only and claimed that civilian casualties from 
antivehicle mines were rare. The official alleged that other, unnamed, armed groups in Yemen had used 
antipersonnel mines.
30 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims,” 8 September 2016, www.hrw.org/
news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims.
31 HRW, “Yemen: New Houthi Landmine Use,” 18 November 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/18/yemen-
new-houthi-landmine-use.
32 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Peru, Sweden), “Report and 
preliminary observations for 2016 intersessional meetings,” May 2016, bit.ly/MBTCompliance16May2016. 
On 19 February 2016, the treaty’s compliance committee met with a representative of Yemen, who 
informed it that in Yemen “the situation remains unchanged and that no new investigations into the 
alleged use of anti-personnel mines have been conducted. The last investigation took place in 2011 but 
had to be halted due to the political and security situation, and has not been resumed.”
33 Saeed Al Batati, “Tip-offs helped accelerate Al Mukalla liberation,” Gulf News, 9 May 2016, http://m.
gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/tip-offs-helped-accelerate-al-mukalla-liberation-1.1821207.
1980s-vintage Bulgarian-made PSM-1 
antipersonnel mines offered for sale in an arms 
bazaar in Marib, Yemen. 








In June 2016, Reuters reported that Libyan forces, mainly composed of fighters from 
nearby Misrata, were encountering “mines and concealed explosives” as they fought to 
capture Sirte from IS militants besieged in the center of the city.34 Several international 
media representatives visited the city in September 2016, when IS forces left parts of the 
city. Fabio Bucciarelli, an Italian photojournalist who documented fighting in Sirte in 2011 
and returned in 2016, told TIME that his second visit was different because “today’s war is 
an even dirtier one” as “ISIS militants used booby-traps, IEDs and car bombs in its attempt 
to hold onto the city.”35 In September 2016, a visiting Russia Today (RT) reporter described 
booby-traps or “explosive devices masked as innocent-looking objects” throughout the 
city.36 One Twitter user has posted several examples of improvised antipersonnel mines 
this year.37
Until 2016, the last recorded landmine use in Libya was 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines 
discovered at Tripoli International Airport in August 2014 by the Libya Dawn alliance, led by 
militias from the coastal city of Misrata. A coalition of militias from the inland mountain town 
of Zintan controlled the airport from the end of 2011 until Libya Dawn seized it in 2014.
Myanmar
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently 
documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in Myanmar 
(Burma). During this reporting period, information available to the Monitor indicates a 
continuation of the trend of a significantly lower level of new mine use.
In September 2016, Deputy Minister of Defence Major General Myint Nwe informed 
the Myanmar parliament that the army continues to use landmines in the internal armed 
conflict.38 At the same session, a Member of Parliament from Shan State said that “it can’t be 
denied that non-state armed groups are also using landmines…particularly since 2012.”39
There have been numerous reports from various credible local sources that antipersonnel 
mines or devices have been used in Kachin, Kayin, and Shan states between October 2015 
and October 2016.40 It is often not possible to determine if the army or a NSAG laid the 
mines. NSAGs operating in those provinces include the Democratic Karen Benevolence 
Army, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance 
34 “Libyan forces battle Islamic State snipers for streets of Sirte,” Reuters (Sirte), 29 July 2016, www.reuters.
com/article/us-libya-security-sirte-idUSKCN1092E0.
35 Olivier Laurent, “Now and Then: Photographing the Battles for Sirte,” Time.com, 25 October 2016, http://
time.com/4537800/photographing-battles-for-sirte/.
36 RT interviewed and accompanied pro-government Libyan engineers who told him they had found five 
“bomb factories” that IS operated during its occupation of Sirte. “Death on every corner: RT takes a look 
behind ISIS bomb-making industry in Sirte,” RT, 8 September 2016, www.rt.com/news/358622-libya-sirte-
isis-bomb-whiteman/.
37 A video uploaded in August reportedly shows a Libyan army officer clearing a victim-activated improvised 
explosive device consisting of a 155mm artillery shell main charge and a pressure plate trigger that he 
described as a “very common design of IED found in Benghazi.” Photographs posted online that month 
show the clearance of a large pressure plate linked to an artillery shell main charge found at the foot 
of a stairwell inside a building. The location is not identified. Photographs posted online by the same 
account on 1 March and reportedly taken in Benghazi show a grenade with a silk wire “booby-trap” 
discovered by civilians returning home after the Libya National Army liberated the area. See: “Libya Army 
EOD renders safe an IED in Benghazi - August 2016,” YouTube.com, 25 August 2015, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_HSiBKRwkiU; @JanusThe2, “#Libya Large, blue pressure plate with #artillery shell main 
charge found at foot of a stairwell and rendered safe,” 3 August 2016, 5:05 AM, Tweet,  https://twitter.com/
JanusThe2/status/760808847632203776; and @JanusThe2, “Civilian returning home to #Benghazi after 
LNA liberated the area found this: grenade with silk wire ‘booby-trap’,” 1 March 2016, 12:24 AM, Tweet, 
https://twitter.com/JanusThe2/status/704582980442923008.




40 See country profile for details, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
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Army, the Shan State Army-South, the Shan State Progress Party/
Shan State Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). 
In January 2016, China protested after a Chinese official was 
injured on the China-Myanmar border by a landmine that was 
apparently laid during fighting between the Myanmar military and an 
armed group, however it is unknown which side laid the landmine.41 
Local residents of Kutkai township in Shan State accused the KIA and 
the TNLA of planting landmines in the town in January 2016.42 The 
TNLA had previously stated it would refrain from mine use.43
North Korea
In July 2016, South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency published allegations 
of mine use by North Korea in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between 
the two countries.44 In August 2016, the US military, citing the United 
Nations Command (UNC), reported that North Korea was using 
landmines, and that the UNC condemned the new mine laying as a violation of the 1953 
armistice.45 Previously, two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the South Korean side of the 
DMZ at Yeonchon in Gyeonggi province were maimed on 4 August 2015 by antipersonnel 
mines. The South Korean military accused North Korea of laying PMD-6 wooden box mines, 
made in North Korea.
North Korea denied the use.46 In August 2015, the North Korean ambassador asserted that 
the South Korean military had identified the mine as its own, a round M-14, on 4 August and 
then changed it to a square North Korean box mine on 10 August for political purposes.47
Pakistan
In April 2016, a representative of Pakistan told the Monitor that 14% of recovered IEDs 
used by militants in Pakistan are victim-activated. The explosive devices are victim-activated 
through pressure plate and infra-red initiation. Sometimes these improvised antipersonnel 
mines are used as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one initiator will set off multiple 
explosive devices.48 NSAGs in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
41 Guy Dinmore and Wa Lone, “China protests after landmine injures official,” Myanmar Times, 6 January 2016, 
www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/18337-china-protests-after-landmine-injures-official.html.
42 “Local residents call for removal of landmines in Kutkai,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 3 March 2016, 
www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2016-03-03-red.pdf; and, Nyein Nyein, “Ethnic Civilians Demand 
End to Army Abuses in Shan State,” Irrawaddy, 2 March 2016, www.irrawaddy.com/burma/ethnic-civilians-
demand-end-to-army-abuses-in-shan-state.html.
43 The TNLA is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) which signed the Geneva 
Call Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel landmines in 2007.  Since 2014, Geneva Call has 
been pursuing inquiries about allegations of mine use made against the TNLA. See, “Burma/Myanmar: 
Geneva Call urges an end to mine use in northern Shan State,” Geneva Call, 14 July 2016, genevacall.org/
burmamyanmar-geneva-call-urges-end-mine-use-northern-shan-state/.
44 “N.K. seen doubling landmines in DMZ this year: S. Korean military,” Yonhap News Agency, 3 July 2016, 
english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/07/03/0200000000AEN20160703004000315.html
45 “N. Korea reportedly laying land mines near landmark bridge,” Stars and Stripes, 26 August 2016, www.
stripes.com/news/pacific/n-korea-reportedly-laying-land-mines-near-landmark-bridge-1.425108.
46 “North Korea Rejects Landmine Blasts Blame,” Sky News, 14 August 2015, news.sky.com/story/north-
korea-rejects-landmine-blasts-blame-10349417.
47 “North Korea Ambassador’s August 21, 2015 Opening Statement at UN Press Conference,” Scribd.com, 
bit.ly/NKorea21Aug2015.
48 Presentation by Pakistani delegation to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol 
II Meeting of Experts, digital recording, 6 April 2016, http://conf.unog.ch/; and Landmine Monitor interview 
with Pakistani delegation to the CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 8 April 2016.
Over the past year, 
non-state armed 











used antipersonnel landmines and victim-activated explosive devices during the reporting 
period. Use was attributed to Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan insurgent groups.49
Syria
In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government use of antipersonnel mines in 
the country’s border areas.50 A Syrian official acknowledged the government had “undertaken 
many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”51
In 2016, reports of mine use by IS and Syrian government forces increased. The Syrian 
Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reported several incidents from mines that IS fighters 
likely laid as the group controlled the territory for prolonged periods of time. For example, 
in Aleppo governate alone, SNHR reported civilian casualties in August, September, and 
October 2016 from landmines that IS apparently laid in the villages of Najm,52 Abu Qalqal,53 
Al Humar,54 and Al Dadat.55
In January 2016, Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF) reported 
that Syrian government forces laid landmines around the town of Madaya in Rif Dimashq 
governorate, 10 kilometers from the Lebanon border. According to MSF, civilians trying to 
flee the city have been killed and injured by “bullets and landmines.”56 In October 2016, 
residents of Madaya claimed that the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, operating together 
with government forces, laid antipersonnel mines around the town. A medical group and a 
media organization reported that “landmines” have been laid around the edge of the town.57
In March 2016, Syrian government forces in the city of Palmyra reported that they were 
finding “landmines” planted by IS fighters.58
During a five-day investigation in Manbij in early October 2016, HRW collected the names 
of 69 civilians, including 19 children, killed by improvised mines, including booby-traps, laid 
in schools, homes, and on roads during and after the fighting for control for the city, involving 
49 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director, Sustainable Peace And Development Organization 
(SPADO), 28 July 2016; and Tariq Saeed, “Landmine blast in KA killed two FC men,” Pakistan Observer, 23 
April 2016, pakobserver.net/landmine-blast-in-ka-killed-two-fc-men/. 
50 ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines,” 2 November 2011, www.
icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.aspx.
51 “Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” The Associated Press, 1 November 2011, www.
haaretz.com/news/middle-east/assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200.
52 “Children died in ISIS landmine explosion in Najm village in Aleppo governorate, August 23,” Syrian 
Network for Human Rights, London, 23 August 2016, bit.ly/sn4hr23Aug2016.
53 “Victims died due to ISIS landmine explosion in Abu Qalqal town in Aleppo governorate, September 2,” 
Syrian Network for Human Rights, London, 2 September 2016, bit.ly/sn4hr2Sep2016.
54 “Civilians died due to ISIS landmines explosion in Mazyounet Al Humar village in Aleppo governorate, 
September 21,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, London, 21 September 2016,  bit.ly/sn4hr21Sep2016.
55 “Children died in ISIS landmine explosion in O’wn Al Dadat village in Aleppo governorate in October 4,” 
Syrian Network for Human Rights, London, 4 October 2016, bit.ly/sn4hr4Oct2016.
56 MSF, “Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya,” 7 January 2016, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/
syria-siege-and-starvation-madaya. 
57 See, “Injured by one of 8,000 landmines in desperate escape bid, Madaya man faces double amputation,” 
Syria Direct, 5 October 2016, bit.ly/SyriaDirect5Oct2016; “Madaya: Starvation Under Siege,” Syrian 
American Medical Association, January 2016, p. 1, www.sams-usa.net/foundation/images/Report_Madaya_
Starvation_Under_Siege_.pdf; and Monitor email interview with Kristen Gillespie Demilio, Editor-in-Chief, 
Syria Direct, 7 October 2016.
58 Raf Sanchez, “Syrian regime troops struggle to clear explosive booby traps in Palmyra,” The Telegraph, 
28 March 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/28/syrian-regime-troops-struggle-to-clear-
explosive-booby-traps-in/.
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IS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and other forces 
supported by the US government.59 Nearly all the incidents HRW documented appeared to 
have been caused by victim-activated IEDs, rather than by explosives detonated by a vehicle 
or by remote-control. 
ALLEGATIONS AND OTHER REPORTS
Landmine Monitor has also recorded allegations and other reports of new mine use by 
NSAGs in States Parties Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Philippines, and Tunisia, as well as states not 
party Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Monitor cannot confirm use in any of these instances.
Various media outlets have continued to report new “landmine” use by Boko Haram 
militants in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.60 Landmine Monitor has not confirmed the nature of 
the devices used or the circumstances of the allegations.
In March 2016, the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines called on the Bangsamoro 
Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway faction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 
to stop using victim-activated explosive devices at Barangay Tee in Datu Salibo municipality 
in Maguindanao province and to respect international humanitarian law.61 In June 2016, 
government troops were killed and injured by explosive devices left by Islamist armed 
groups fleeing their camp.62
In Tunisia, government forces engaged in operations against militants in Jebel Al-Cha’anby 
in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate near the Algerian border suffered casualties from 
victim-activated explosive devices in 2015 and 2016.63 The Monitor cannot confirm when 
the improvised mines were emplaced, but due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is 
likely that they were recently laid.
In October 2015, several newspapers reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards were 
laying antipersonnel mines on Iran’s border with northern Iraq. Eyewitnesses reportedly 
observed the mine-laying operation and media reports state that the Kurdish authorities 
warned the inhabitants of the Penjwen area of Sulaymaniyah governorate not to approach 
59 HRW Press Release, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016, 
www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/26/syria-improvised-mines-kill-injure-hundreds-manbij.
60 “Landmine Explosion Kills 6 Soilders at Niger-Nigerian Border,” Africa News, 8 January 2016, www.
africanews.com/2016/01/18/landmine-explosion-kills-6-soilders-at-niger-nigerian-border/; Edwin 
Kindzeka Moki, “Boko Haram Land Mine Kills 2 in Cameroon Military Convoy,” The Daily Mail, 15 February 
2016, www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3447888/Boko-Haram-land-kills-2-Cameroon-military-
convoy.html; Edwin Kindzeka Moki, “Cameroon Vigilantes Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines,” VOA News, 
4 March 2016, www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-vigilantes-hunt-for-boko-haram-landmines/3219444.
html; “Fighting Boko Haram: Landmine seriously injures 3 Cameroonian service men,” Cameroon Concord, 
8 June 2016, bit.ly/CameroonConcord8Jun2016; “Boko Haram landmine kills four Chadian soldiers,” 
Reuters, 27 August 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-chad-idUSKCN1120KY; and “Boko 
Haram Landmines Inflict Heavy Toll on Cameroon,” Latin America Herald Tribune, 29 June 2016, www.laht.
com/article.asp?ArticleId=2415012&CategoryId=12395. Niger has not filed an updated Article 7 report 
since 2012, but noted in an Article 5 extension request of March 2016 that new contamination by Boko 
Haram had occurred. Chad submitted an annual Article 7 report in March 2016, but did not include any 
information on new contamination. Cameroon has not filed an updated Article 7 report since 2009 and 
has provided no official information to States Parties on any new contamination.
61 Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines, “BIFF should stop using Victim-Activated Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs),” 2 March 2016, www.facebook.com/PhilippineBanLandmines/.
62 The device appears to have been victim-activated, but details of the mechanism were not available to 
the Monitor. The use was attributed to Dawlah Islamiya, comprised of rogue Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and foreign combatants led by Abdullah Maute. “2 soldiers killed, 5 hurt in landmine blast in 
Lanao Sur,” Philippine Inquirer, 2 June 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/788832/2-soldiers-killed-5-hurt-
in-landmine-blast-in-lanao-sur.
63 See for example, Tarek Amara, “Two Tunisians killed in landmine blast near Algerian border: ministry,” 









the border due to new mine use. The mines were reportedly laid to prevent incursion by 
Kurdish militants and smugglers.64
Saudi Arabia has reported that soldiers have been injured by landmines on its border 
with Yemen, however it is not clear from the reports on which side of the border the mines 
were laid or who had laid them.65
STOCKPILES OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES POSSESSED 
BY STATES NOT PARTY AND NON-STATE ARMED 
GROUPS
The Monitor estimates that as 
many as 31 of the 35 states not party 
to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile 
landmines. Previously, in 1999, the 
Monitor estimated that, collectively, 
states not party stockpile about 160 
million antipersonnel mines, but today 
the global total may be less than 50 
million.66
It is unclear if all 31 states are 
currently stockpiling antipersonnel 
mines. Officials from the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided 
contradictory information regarding 
its possession of stocks, while Bahrain 
and Morocco have stated that they 
have only small stockpiles used solely 
for training purposes. 
Three states not party, all Pacific 
states, have said that they do not 
stockpile antipersonnel mines: 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and 
Tonga. It is unclear if Palestine 
possesses stockpiles of antipersonnel 
mines.
States not party to the Mine Ban 
Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled 
antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing 
out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in 
China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.
 Iranian army mines the border with“) ”قارعلا-ناتسدرك-عم-دودحلا-ىلع-اماغلأ-عرزي-يناريإلا-شيجل“ 64
Kurdistan Iraq”), Al Araby Algaded, 25 October 2015, bit.ly/AlArabyAlgaded25Oct2015; and “عرزت-ناريا-
/Iranian mines along border”), Iraq News Agency, 26 October 2015, bit.ly“) ”عم-دودحلا-دادتما-ىلع-اماغلا
IraqNewsAgency26Oct2015. 
65 “Saudi Arabia says guard killed by land mine on Yemen border,” Al Arabiya (AP), 13 July 2016, bit.ly/
AlArabiya13July2016; and “Saudi officer killed by landmine on Yemen border,” The New Arab, 24 May 2016, 
www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/5/24/saudi-officer-killed-by-landmine-on-yemen-border.
66 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an 
amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known 
whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are 
counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China 
was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile.
Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel 
mines
Russia 26.5 million
Pakistan estimated 6 million
India estimated 4–5 million
China “less than” 5 million
US 3 million
Total 45 million



































Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to access factory-made antipersonnel mines now that 
production and transfers have halted under the Mine Ban Treaty, and stockpiles have largely 
been destroyed. Some NSAGs have acquired mine stocks, at times stolen from arsenals or 
purchased from corrupt officials in states not party, or removed them from minefields, but 
most appear to make their own improvised mines, also known as IEDs and as booby-traps, 
from locally available materials. 
During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, 
Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were reported to possess stocks 
of factory-made antipersonnel mines or components to manufacture victim-activated IEDs 
(improvised mines). The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces or 
verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.
PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.67 Forty-one 
states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to 
the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.68
In November 2015, Singapore Technologies Engineering announced that it had ceased 
production of antipersonnel mines and published the decision on its website in a section 
entitled “Sustainability Governance.”69 In a letter to PAX, a Dutch NGO, the company’s 
president Tan Pheng Hock stated, “ST Engineering is now no longer in the business of 
designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions or any 
related key components.”70 The Monitor will continue to list Singapore as a producer until 
the government formally commits to no future production. Singapore already observes an 
indefinite export moratorium.
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the 
previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing 
mines but reserve the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
NSAGs in countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Somalia, and Syria fabricate antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. The NGO 
Conflict Armament Research reported in April 2015 that IS is producing and deploying IEDs 
on a large scale.71
67 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that 
some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
68 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the 
Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.
69 See the Singapore Technologies Engineering  website, www.stengg.com/corporate-governance/
sustainability/sustainability-governance. See also, Stop Explosive Investments, “Singapore Technologies 
Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 18 November 2015, bit.ly/STE18Nov2015. Investors 
received similar letters; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 
18 November 2015, www.lapfforum.org/press/files/20151118SingaporeTechnologiespressreleasefinal.
pdf.
70 Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies 
Engineering Ltd, 11 November 2015.
71 Forum on the Arms Trade and Stimson Center, “Tracking arms in conflict: Lessons from Syria and Iraq,” 
7 April 2015, www.forumarmstrade.org/uploads/1/9/0/8/19082495/april7_findings_final.pdf. See also, 









TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES 
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the 
mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to 
the weapon. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of 
antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999. However, the use of factory-
produced antipersonnel mines in conflicts in Yemen and Ukraine, where declared stockpiles 
had been destroyed, indicates that some transfers, either internally among actors or from 
sources external to the country, are occurring. 
Three types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen 
since 2013: PPM-2 mines, GYATA-64 mines, and a Bulgarian-made PSM-1 bounding 
fragmentation mine, found in its 1980s-vintage factory packaging in an arms bazaar in the 
town of Marib in 2015. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel 
mines that Yemen reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance 
personnel. The evidence of further use of these specific types of antipersonnel mines in 
2015 and 2016 suggests either that Yemen’s 2002 declaration to the UN Secretary-General 
on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were 
acquired from another source after 2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, said 
that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, 
noting that the current government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due 
to instability and fighting.72
The State Security Service of Ukraine has reported seizing and recovering antipersonnel 
mines from Russian-backed separatists in 2016, including 24 MON-series directional 
fragmentation munitions, five OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, one PMN-2 blast 
mine, and 24 TM-62 antivehicle mines.73 Ukraine finished destroying stockpiles of PMN mines 
in 2003; other mine types are possessed by Russia, Ukraine, and any number of successor 
states of the Soviet Union.
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, 
have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters 
have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, 
and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the 
contrary.74
UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states that had not signed it 
by then may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially 
combines signature and ratification. Of the 162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the 
treaty, while 30 acceded.75
72 Letter to HRW from Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2016, www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/supporting_resources/yemeni_mofa_response_to_hrw_landmines_sept_7_2016.pdf.
73 All data taken from State Security Service of Ukraine website for 2016, starting at https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/
news/27/category/21 and working backwards in time.
74 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were 
clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 
1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor 
and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian 
antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the 
coast of the Gaza Strip.
75 The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of 
“succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and 
South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before 
entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
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The last country to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty was Oman on 20 August 2014. 
The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the 
last signatory yet to ratify.
On 2 March 2016, Ambassador Ravinatha Pandukabhaya Aryasinha announced that 
Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers has approved accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, but the 
instrument of ratification had not been deposited as of 15 October 2016.76
The US government announced policy measures in June and September 2014 banning US 
production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerating stockpile destruction, 
and banning mine use, except on the Korean Peninsula.77 The Obama administration also 
indicated its “aspiration” for the US to “eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention,” but 
there have been few signs of new steps toward that goal.78 
ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
Since 1997, the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside 
the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to indicate their support for the 
humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. A dozen of the 
countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after voting in favor of 
consecutive UNGA resolutions.79
On 7 December 2015, UNGA Resolution 70/55 calling for universalization and full 
implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 168 states in favor, none 
against, and 17 abstentions.80 This is the highest number of affirmative votes for the annual 
resolution.81
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, 
most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the US, and Vietnam.82
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, 
which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the 
weapon. In June 2015, the Kurdistan Freedom Party of Iran signed the Geneva Call Deed of 
Commitment pledging not to use antipersonnel mines.83 At least 65 NSAGs have committed 
76 ICBL, “Sri Lanka decides to join Mine Ban Treaty,” 3 March 2016, http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-
events/news/2016/sri-lanka-decides-to-join-mine-ban-treaty.aspx.
77 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” The White 
House, 23 September 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-
anti-personnel-landmine-policy.
78 Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest en route Joint Base Andrews, 
6/27/2014,” The White House, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/WhiteHouse27June2016.
79 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, 
Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.
80 The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
81 Previously, the resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor in 2013 and 2010, while 
the lowest number of votes in support was 138 in 2001.
82 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
83 Geneva Call, “Iran: a Kurdish armed movement takes official commitments to reinforce the protection 
of civilian,” Press Release, 28 June 2015, genevacall.org/iran-kurdish-armed-movement-takes-official-
commitments-reinforce-protection-civilian/. Geneva Call states that the group is not currently using 
antipersonnel landmines. It is not known if the group possesses a stockpile or was a past user. While 









to halt using antipersonnel mines since 1997.84 The exact number is difficult to determine, 
as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become 
part of state structures. 
CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into 
force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-
traps, and other explosive devices. Weaknesses of the original protocol and inadequate 
measures to improve it through Amended Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process 
that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2016, a total of 102 states were party to 
Amended Protocol II. 
Only 10 states that are party to Amended Protocol 
II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, 
India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the 
protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest 
are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban 
Treaty.
The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and 
other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983. 
It has largely been superseded by the 1996 Amended 
Protocol II, but 13 states that are party to the original 
protocol have yet to ratify the amended protocol: Cuba, 
Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan and Mine Ban Treaty 
States Parties Burundi, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. 
A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban 
Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also landmine 
producers.
STATUS AND OPERATION OF THE  
MINE BAN TREATY
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has 
been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities 
have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious 
compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of 
antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States 
Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including 
those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance, which are detailed in other chapters 
of this report.
COMPLIANCE
At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties created a new 
Committee on Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern about compliance 
84 As of October 2015, 45 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by 
the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva 
Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 
2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the 
Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
States that stockpile antipersonnel 


















Note: Italics indicate states that also reserve the 
right to produce antipersonnel mines
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with the prohibitions contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, to consider any 
follow-up that might be appropriate for States Parties.85
The chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance delivered a report 
to the May 2016 intersessional meetings, detailing its work and preliminary observations 
concerning allegations or reports of landmine use in States Parties. According to the report, 
beginning in January 2016, “the Committee met regularly to consider past instances of alleged 
use of antipersonnel mines and assess the credibility of these allegations and the value 
of follow-up on them.”86 The committee met with the representatives of concerned States 
Parties Sudan, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue 
regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel mines. The committee did not recommend 
specific actions be taken by States Parties, but will continue its work to further follow-up on 
these and other allegations of use. 
USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES BY STATES PARTIES 
In this reporting period, commencing in October 2015, there has been no confirmed use of 
antipersonnel mines by government forces of States Parties. Prior to Landmine Monitor Report 
2013, there had never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed 
forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became binding international law in 1999. 
That is no longer the case since the confirmation by Yemen that a violation of the convention 
by its forces occurred in 2011. 
A number of allegations of mine use in previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan 
(in 2013 and 2011) and Sudan (in 2011) were addressed by the Mine Ban Treaty Committee 
on Cooperative Compliance in its report to the May 2016 intersessional meetings.87
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile antipersonnel mines, of which 89 
have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 65 have declared never 
possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes). Tuvalu has 
not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somalia 
acknowledged that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” 
and that Somalia is “putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in 
its stockpile.”88 No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for 
Somalia, which has a destruction deadline of 1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual 
update to its transparency report since 2014.
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 51 million stockpiled antipersonnel 
mines, including more than 2.1 million destroyed in 2015. 
85 The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with the States Parties concerned, 
clarify the situation, and if as a result it assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps 
that the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention remains strong and effective; 
For cases where the concern is credible, present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if 
need be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences; 
Remain transparent and accountable, including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and 
Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and 
Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-
Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf. 
86 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance, “Report and Preliminary Observations,” May 2016, 
bit.ly/MBTComplianceMay2016.
87 “Report and Preliminary Observations Committee On Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Chile, 
Peru and Sweden), 2016 Intersessional Meetings,” May 2016, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/MBTComplianceMay2016.
88 Mine Ban Treaty Initial Article 7 Report (for the period 16 April 2012 to 30 March 2013), Section E, and 








Four States Parties possess more than seven million antipersonnel mines remaining to be 
destroyed: Ukraine (5.4 million), Belarus (1.5 million), Greece (643,265), and Oman (15,734). 
Poland reported informally to Landmine Monitor that it had completed the destruction 
of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the second half of 2016, well ahead of its 1 June 
2017 deadline, and that it intended to make a formal announcement at the Mine Ban Treaty 
Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2016.89
Oman destroyed 1,526 antipersonnel mines in two destruction events in September 
2015.90 It has committed to destroy its stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.
Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the 
destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.91 The inability of Belarus, Greece, 
and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States 
Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 called on States 
Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their 
plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. 
The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of 
their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
Belarus reported destroying 1,862,080 PFM-1 mines in 2015 in its transparency report 
submitted on 30 April 2016.92 At the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties in December 
2015, Belarus said the project to destroy stockpiles of PFM-type mines was extended until 
August 2020 and the contract between the European Commission and the company in 
charge of carrying out destruction, EXPAL, until February 2018.93 In a May 2016 progress 
report, Belarus stated that this project is scheduled to be completed by the end of  2017.94 
Belarus also stated that it will destroy any residual stocks of PFM mines that were in an 
“unsafe” condition to be destroyed by EXPAL.95
Complicated legal and contractual issues surrounding the destruction of Greece’s stockpile 
of antipersonnel mines continue to stall any physical destruction. This situation is further 
complicated by the stockpiles being located in both Greece and Bulgaria.96 Greece reported 
in May 2016 that an amended contract between the Ministry of National Defence and the 
Hellenic Defence Systems will be signed at some unspecified point to set a timetable for the 
destruction of the remaining stockpiles.97
At the May 2016 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that on 19 October 2015 
an additional agreement was reached among the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, NATO 
Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the resumption of 
the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines. Within the context of this 
agreement, a total of 642,960 PFM-1 mines are slated to be destroyed between 2015 and 
89 Email from Zbigniew Ciolek, Counselor (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN in Geneva, 
25 October 2016.
90 The report states that between 13–16 September 2015 Oman destroyed 826 antipersonnel mines: 126 
No. 7 dingbat mines; 578 M409 mines; and 122 DM 31 antipersonnel mines. Subsequently, between 
20–23 September 2015, Oman destroyed 700 antipersonnel mines: 578 M409 mines and 122 DM31 
mines. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), undated, p. 2, bit.ly/MBTOman2016Art7. The report is 
in a non-standard format of 4 pages.
91 Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
92 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7, Form B, 30 April 2016, bit.ly/MBTBelarus2016Art7.
93 Statement of Belarus, Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2015, 
bit.ly/MBTBelarus3Dec2015.
94 Statement of Belarus, Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 20 May 2016, 
bit.ly/MBTBelarus20May2016. 
95 Statement of Belarus, Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2015, 
bit.ly/MBTBelarus3Dec2015.
96 For information on the status of Greek stockpiles located in Bulgaria, see, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2016/greece/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
97 Statement of Greece, Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 20 May 2016, 
bit.ly/MBTGreece20May2016.
24 
the end of 2016; 233,496 had been destroyed by 1 May 2016.98 Ukraine has not detailed any 
plans to destroy stockpiled POM-2 antipersonnel mines.  
MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH 
(ARTICLE 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-
personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or 
mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum 
number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.” 
A total of 71 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for 
training and research purposes, of which 40 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three 
(Finland, Turkey, and Bangladesh) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-six 
States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 33 
states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. 
In addition to those listed below, another 32 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 
mines and together possess a total of 13,267 retained mines.99  This amount is 1,952 fewer 
retained mines than reported for the previous year.
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained 
antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or 
otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including 
by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel 
mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 12 States Parties retain 
antipersonnel mines in this condition.100
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining 
mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States 
Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are 
being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have 
been provided about how the mines are being used. Nine States Parties have never reported 
consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force 
for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. 
TRANSPARENCY REPORTING
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 
days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken 
to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 
April, on the preceding calendar year.
Only one State Party has not submitted an initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).
98 Statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 20 May 2016, bit.ly/
MBTUkraineStatement20May2016.
99 Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Jordan (850), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), United Kingdom 
(724), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (590). South Africa (576), Cyprus (500), Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe 
(450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Slovenia (350), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay 
(260), Argentina (212), Lithuania (209), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda 
(65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), Burundi (4).
























Finland 16,500 (2015) 16,500 0 None ever -
Turkey 14,800 (2015) 16,000 102 2015 -
Bangladesh 12,050 (2015) 15,000 0 2013 -
Sweden 6,115 (2015) 13,948 68 2015 -
Belarus 5,997 (2015) 7,530 1 2015 -
Algeria 5,970 (2015) 15,030 0 2009 -
Greece 5,682 (2015) 7,224 115 2015 -
Croatia 5,584 (2015) 17,500 101 2015 -
Venezuela 4,875 (2011) 4,960 N/R 2010 -
Tunisia 4,570 (2015) 5,000 100 2015 -
France 3,955 (2015) 4,539 1 2015 -
Yemen 3,760 (2013) 4,000 N/R 2008 -
Bulgaria 3,416 (2015) 10,466 253 2015 6,446
Nigeria 3,364 (2011) 3,364 N/R None ever -
Thailand 3,345 (2015) 15,604 8 2015 4,517
Serbia 3,149 (2014) 5,000 N/R 2011 1,970
Djibouti 2,996 (2004) 2,996 N/R Unclear -
Chile 2,722 (2015) 28,647 102 2015 23,694
Indonesia 2,454 (2015) 4,978 0 2009 2,524
Brazil 2,437 (2015) 17,000 777 2015 -
Romania 2,395 (2013) 4,000 N/R 2013 1,500
Belgium 2,288 (2015) 5,980 276 2015 -
Czech Rep. 2,218 (2015) 4,859 46 2015 -
Cambodia 2,134 (2015) 700 N/R 2014 -
Peru 2,015 (2015) 9,526 0 2012 7,487
Oman 2,000 (2015) 2,000 N/R None ever -
Sudan 1,938 (2015) 10,000 0 2008 -
Canada 1,897 (2015) 1,781 0 2013 -
Denmark 1,783 (2015) 4,991 0 2013 2,900
Tanzania 1,780 (2008) 1,146 N/R 2007 -
Uganda 1,764 (2011) 2,400 N/R 2003 -
Namibia 1,634 (2009) 9,999 N/R 2009 -
Spain 1,613 (2015) 10,000 0 2014 6,000
Netherlands 1,557 (2014) 4,076 N/R 2013 -
Japan 1,488 (2015) 15,000 175 2015 -
Mozambique 1,265 (2015) 1,427 N/R 2012 260
Slovakia 1,147 (2015) 7,000 0 2014 5,500
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH)
1,031 (2015) 2,405 N/R Unclear -
Kenya 1,020 (2007) 3,000 N/R 2007 -
Botswana 1,019 (2011) 1,019 N/R Unclear -
Partial total 145,509 316,595 2,125 62,798
Note: N/R = not reported
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As of 15 October 2016, only 45% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for 
calendar year 2015, a slight increase from the previous year (41%). A total of 89 States 
Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2015.101
Of this group, 80 States Parties have failed to submit an annual transparency report for 
two or more years.102
No state that is currently not party to the treaty submitted a voluntary report in 2015. 
In previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao 
PDR (2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2012 and 2013), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted 
voluntary reports. 
101 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, 
Burkina Faso , Burundi , Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Comoros, DRC, Congo (Rep of), 
Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, 
São Tomé & Príncipe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Suriname, 
Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Vanuatu, 
Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
102 A total of nine States Parties submitted reports for 2014 but have not submitted reports for 2015: Burundi, 























A technician heads to work in a minefield near Zouarke, Chad.




















































































Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics. 
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas. 
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control. 
*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia. 
**** The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include 
contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh and not mine contamination in 
the adjacent territories. 
Six States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Cameroon, Djibouti, Moldova, 
Namibia, the Philippines, and Tunisia.
States and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination
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STATUS AND KEY DEVELOPMENTS  
2015–20161
  Sixty-four states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine 
contamination: 36 States Parties, 24 states not party, and four other areas. This is 
an increase from 61 states and areas in 2015, as Palau has been added to the list, 
and Mozambique and Nigeria returned to it. A further six States Parties have either 
suspected or residual mine contamination
  A total of 171km2 was reported to be cleared of landmines in 2015, a decrease from 
an estimated 201km2 in 2014. The total number of antipersonnel mines reported to 
be destroyed was nearly 158,000, a decrease from 232,000 in 2014.
  Twenty-six States Parties have completed implementation of Article 5 since 1999.2
  In 2015, five States Parties submitted extensions that were granted at the Fourteenth 
Meeting of States Parties: Cyprus, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Two states 
requested extended deadlines in 2016: Niger and Peru.
  Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 due to missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline 
without having been granted an extension.
  Jordan, Mozambique, and Nigeria should declare that they have obligations under 
Article 5 and request a new deadline to complete clearance.
  Only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their Article 5 clearance 
deadline: Algeria, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Ecuador.
MINE CONTAMINATION IN 2015
It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines 
due to a lack of data. The understanding of the scale of the problem is generally improving, 
however, particularly among States Parties as countries make increased use of land release 
methodologies to cancel suspected hazardous areas by non-technical survey, and reduce 
confirmed hazardous areas through technical survey. However, in some states the extent of 
mine contamination became less clear in 2015 and 2016 due to reports of new contamination. 
There was new contamination in 2015 and/or 2016 in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen; and states not party North Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and 
Syria. There are also reports and allegations of new contamination in States Parties Cameroon, 
Chad, Niger, Philippines, South Sudan, and Tunisia; and in states not party Egypt and Iran. 
Nigeria returned to the list of contaminated states as a result of reports of new 
contamination. Mozambique also returned to the list because of the discovery of pre-existing 
contamination. However, both states have yet to make a formal declaration of Article 5 
obligations. Palau was added to the list as World War II-era emplaced antipersonnel mines 
were found and destroyed in 2015. Palau needs to confirm if it has any further antipersonnel 
contamination.3
No estimate of the size of contamination exists for eight States Parties, 18 states not 
party, and one other area, which are known to be contaminated.4 
1 The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and 
published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it 
with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
2 In addition, El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the Mine Ban Treaty was created. Three 
states  (Jordan, Nigeria, and Mozambique) that had declared completion in the past are still finding 
antipersonnel mine contamination, including victim-activated improvised mines (Nigeria)—they are not 
included in the total figure of 26 States Parties.
3 Email to the Palau Authorities from Steve Ballinger, Operations Director, General Demining Command 
(CGD), 1 December 2015.
4 For further details of the estimated extent of antipersonnel mine contamination, see the Mine Action 

















The table below is based on information provided by states. Some states currently report 
exceedingly large suspected hazardous areas. Over time, as they develop a more accurate 
understanding through survey, the category into which the state has been placed may change.
Estimated extent of mine contamination at end of 2015
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Americas
East and South 











































































Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics. 
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas. 
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control. 
*** The known area in Georgia is small, but there also may be mined areas in South Ossetia. 
**** The known area in Nagorno-Karabakh is small, but that estimate is believed to only include 
contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh and not mine contamination in 
the adjacent territories. 
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Six States Parties have residual or suspected contamination: Cameroon5, Djibouti,6 
Moldova,7 Namibia,8 the Philippines,9 and Tunisia.10 These states have an obligation to 
make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain 
antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. They must report publicly on 
any contamination and on clearance efforts. In cases where they are unable to complete 
clearance within their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain 
in compliance with the treaty.
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2015
Total global clearance of landmines in 2015 was estimated to be 171km2, with nearly 
158,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed. This represents a decrease from 201km2 of total 
area cleared in 2014 and a decrease from the destruction of approximately 232,000 
antipersonnel mines.
Programs clearing the largest amount of mined area in 2015
State Mined area cleared (km2)
Antipersonnel mines 
destroyed
Cambodia 46.5 8,841 




South Sudan 5.0 1,715
Angola 4.1 3,919




Other programs combined 12.5 41,155
Total global clearance 170.9 157,672
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold and other area in italics.
5 Various media outlets have reported “landmine” use by Boko Haram militants. Cameroon should publicly 
address these reports, and immediately inform States Parties of any newly discovered antipersonnel mine 
contamination.
6 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a 
military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be 
mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not 
made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.
7 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested 
it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic 
of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, bit.ly/MoldovaNSA2008.
8 Despite a statement by Namibia made at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance 
with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for 
example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
9 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent 
years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.
10 There have been casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices in Tunisia in 2015 and 

















Four of the 10 most 
contaminated states (Azerbaijan, 
BiH, Chad, and Turkey) are not 
among those that cleared the 
largest amount of mined area in 
2015, but instead are accounted 
for in “other programs combined” 
along with other states. No 
mine clearance was conducted 
in State Party Turkey in 2015, 
although 1,531 antipersonnel 
mines were destroyed “due to 
explosions caused by various 
reasons.”11 States Parties BiH 
and Chad and state not party 
Azerbaijan reported low rates of clearance, between 0.26km2 and 1.64km2 each.
No mine clearance or survey occurred in States Parties Ethiopia, Turkey, Senegal, and 
Yemen;12 and in states not party Cuba, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. No data was available for 
survey and clearance results in States Parties Eritrea, Nigeria, and Ukraine; and states not 
party China, Egypt, India, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, and 
Uzbekistan. 
MINE BAN TREATY ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel 
mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. 
States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations 
within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.
COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION
Twenty-six States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance 
since the treaty entered into force in 1999. 




























* Montenegro still has to formally report completion of Article 5 implementation, but is not believed 
to have any antipersonnel mine contamination left.
In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of 
known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994, 
before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.
11 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form G.
12 Antipersonnel mines were destroyed during spot clearance only.











2015 171 157,672 14,000
2014 201 231,708 11,500
2013 185 275,000 4,500
2012 200 240,000 9,300
2011 200 388,000 27,000
Total 957 1,292,380 66,300
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Both Jordan13 and Mozambique14 have declared completion of clearance under the Mine 
Ban Treaty (in 2012 and 2015 respectively), but they are still finding antipersonnel mine 
contamination and therefore do not appear in the table above. Nigeria15 declared completion 
of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports of new contamination resulting from 
recent use of antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices 
(also called improvised mines) by a non-state armed group. It therefore does not appear in 
the table above.
PROGRESS ON MEETING DEADLINES 
As of October 2016, only four States Parties are on track to 
meet their clearance deadlines, while 18 are not on track, and 
the status of six is unclear. Two States Parties are awaiting 
approval of their extension requests submitted in 2016. One 
State Party has missed its deadline and is in violation of the 
treaty. Three States Parties that have declared completion in 
the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination 
and should request new deadlines. 
The assessments of the status of each State Party 
regarding the fulfilment of Article 5 obligations are made 
through consideration of several factors, including the 
deadline date, the remaining challenge and the extent to 
which it is known, clearance rates, mine action capacity and 
assets, funding prospects, and the existence of any conflict 
and insecurity problems.
Five States Parties submitted requests for extended 
deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations that were granted at the Fourteenth 
Meeting of the States Parties, in December 2015:
  Cyprus was granted a three-year extension for a remaining contaminated area over 
which it does not have effective control.16 This was Cyprus’s second extension.
  Ethiopia requested five years to complete survey and clearance of all remaining 
mined areas. States Parties expressed “serious concern” that Ethiopia was in non-
compliance with Article 5, having missed its 1 June 2015 clearance deadline. In 
granting the request, States Parties asked Ethiopia to better disaggregate suspected 
hazardous areas and confirmed hazardous areas, to report annually, and to submit 
an updated plan by April 2017.17
  Mauritania was granted five years because of suspected contamination on its border 
with the area of Western Sahara, in locations where border demarcation needs to be 
clarified. States Parties asked Mauritania to provide regular updates on the dialogue 
with stakeholders aimed at acquiring information about border location.18 This was 
Mauritania’s second extension.
  Niger requested five years to complete survey and clearance of all mined areas. 
However, its request was submitted in November 2015, while the procedure agreed by 
13 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Production, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, APLC/
MSP.12/2012/Misc.3, Geneva, 4 December 2012.
14 Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Production, Stockpiling and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, APLC/
MSP.14/2015/MISC.2, Geneva, 16 December 2015.
15 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 
2011.
16 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 December 2015, p. 5.
17 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
18 Ibid., p. 7.
Mine risk education being delivered in Kirkuk, 
Iraq. 

















States Parties with antipersonnel mine contamination, their deadlines, and status 




deadline Extension period Deadline Status
Afghanistan 1 March 2013 10 years 1 March 2023 Not on track
Algeria 1 April 2012 5 years 1 April 2017 On track
Angola 1 January 2013 5 years 1 January 2018 Not on track
Argentina 1 March 2010 10 years 1 January 2020 No change since extension 
granted 
BiH 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Cambodia 1 January 2010 10 years 1 January 2020 Not on track
Chad 1 November 
2009
14 months (1st extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
6 years (3rd extn.)
1 January 2020 Not on track
Chile 1 March 2012 8 years 1 March 2020 On track
Colombia 1 March 2011 10 years 1 March 2021 Not on track
Croatia 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track 
Cyprus 1 July 2013 3 years (1st extn.)
3 years (2nd extn.)
1 July 2019 No change since extension 
granted
DRC 1 November 
2012
26 months (1st extn.)
6 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 On track
Ecuador 1 October 2009 8 years 1 October 2017 On track
Eritrea 1 February 
2012
3 years (1st extn.)




Ethiopia 1 June 2015 5 years 1 June 2020 Unclear
Iraq 1 February 
2018
N/A N/A Not on track
Jordan 1 May 2009 3 years
Declared completion 
in 2012
1 May 2012 Should submit extension 
request*
Mauritania 1 January 2011 5 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 January 2021 Unclear
Mozambique 1 March 2009 5 years (1st extn.)




1 January 2015 Should declare any 
antipersonnel mine 
contamination and submit 
extension request*
Niger 1 September 
2009
N/A** (1st extn.)
1 year (2nd extn.)
31 December 
2016
Extension requested to 31 
December 2020 
Nigeria 1 March 2012 Declared completion 
in 2011
Should declare any 
antipersonnel mine 
contamination and submit 
extension request*
Oman 1 February 
2025
N/A N/A Unclear
Palau 1 May 2018 N/A N/A Unclear
36 
States Parties required a submission by March 2015. Niger was granted one year and 
was asked to submit another request by March 2016 in order to allow the necessary 
time “for a cooperative exchange between the requesting State and the Committee on 
Article 5 Implementation to take place.”19 This was Niger’s second extension.
  Senegal was granted five years to complete survey and clearance. In granting the request, 
States Parties regretted that “a detailed annual work plan for survey and clearance 
leading to completion and based on accurate and coherent data [was] still missing.” 
They asked Senegal to report annually and to submit an updated workplan by April 2017, 
with annual projections and a detailed budget.20 This was Senegal’s second extension.
The Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties recorded Ukraine’s intention to submit 
an extension request. It noted that “[t]he official, duly compiled, request would be soon 
submitted to the States Parties for their consideration.”21 Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 
for missing its 1 June 2016 mine clearance deadline, a situation that was foreseen already in 
December 2015 when Ukraine expressed its intention to submit an extension request.22 As 
of 15 October 2016, Ukraine had still not submitted a request.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 8.





deadline Extension period Deadline Status
Peru 1 March 2009 8 years 1 March 2017 Extension requested to 31 
December 2024
Senegal 1 March 2009 7 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 March 2021 Unclear
Serbia 1 March 2014 5 years 1 March 2019 Unclear
Somalia 1 October 2022 N/A N/A Not on track
South Sudan 9 July 2021 N/A N/A Not on track
Sudan 1 April 2014 5 years 1 April 2019 Not on track
Tajikistan 1 April 2010 10 years 1 April 2020 Not on track
Thailand 1 May 2009 9.5 years 1 November 
2018
Not on track
Turkey 1 March 2014 8 years 1 March 2022 Not on track 
Ukraine 1 June 2016 N/A N/A Should submit extension 
request
UK 1 March 2009 10 years 1 March 2019 Not on track
Yemen 1 March 2009 6 years (1st extn.)
5 years (2nd extn.)
1 March 2020 Not on track
Zimbabwe 1 March 2009 22 months (1st extn.)
2 years (2nd extn.)
2 years (3rd extn.)
3 years (4th extn.)
1 January 2018 Not on track
Note: N/A = not applicable
* Jordan and Mozambique are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination, while there are reports 
of contamination due to the use of improvised mines by a non-state armed group in Nigeria: those 
three states therefore have outstanding Article 5 obligations to fulfil, and should submit an extension 
request. 
** Niger’s first extension request was granted until 31 December 2015 in accordance with a procedure 

















In 2016, two States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their 
Article 5 obligations for approval at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in November:
  Niger requested until 31 December 2020 to complete survey and clearance of all 
mined areas, noting that “without the support of partners, Niger could not guarantee 
[completion].”23 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) noted that 
Niger’s acceptance of an existing offer of support from an international mine clearance 
organization would contribute to greatly reducing the amount of time necessary.24
  Peru requested until 31 December 2024 to complete survey and clearance, noting 
the difficulties of the terrain and the acquisition of data on additional contaminated 
areas through information exchanges with Ecuador.25 The Committee on Article 5 
Implementation encouraged Peru to make the best possible use of the amended 
International Mine Action Standards on land release “to further enhance efficient 
and expedient implementation.”26
MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF STATES PARTIES 
AGAINST THEIR ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS AND THE 
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN
In the Maputo Action Plan, States Parties agreed to “commit to intensify their efforts to 
complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion 
work requires.”27 Actions 8, 9, and 11 relate to clearance.
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation presented preliminary observations at 
the Intersessional Meetings on 19-20 May 2016, reporting on 17 States Parties that had 
submitted information by that date.28
This assessment of progress under the Maputo Action Plan is drawn from both the 
Committee’s observations and Landmine Monitor’s review of the progress of States Parties.
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN #8: QUANTIFICATION AND 
QUALIFICATION OF REMAINING CONTAMINATION 
CHALLENGE
Almost all States Parties need to improve the quantification and qualification of the 
remaining contamination challenge. Eleven States Parties have a good knowledge of the 
locations of confirmed and suspected contamination but need to clarify the actual extent 
of contamination within those areas: BiH, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, 
Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Fifteen States Parties have reported on known 
contaminated areas, but do not have a complete picture of the extent of contamination, as 
there are unrecorded areas: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Iraq, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Three States 
Parties have not formally recorded the locations of any mined areas: Nigeria, Oman, and 
Ukraine. Two States Parties need to verify that they have no remaining mine contamination: 
Mauritania and Palau. Three States Parties have a very clear understanding of the remaining 
23 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, dated 15 March 2016, submitted on 15 April 2016, p. 13.
24 Statement of the ICBL on Niger’s Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 
May 2016.
25 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), dated July 2016, submitted on 2 August 
2016. 
26 Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional 
Meetings, Geneva, 19–20 May 2016.
27 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan.
28 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 23 June 2015, bit.ly/
MBTArt5Prelim2015. States Parties reported on are Afghanistan, Algeria, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, 
Cyprus, Ecuador, Mauritania, Niger, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, the UK, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
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contamination: DRC, Ecuador, and the UK.29 Algeria has a good understanding of the extent 
of contamination but has not provided details of the size and locations.
The committee assessed the degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding that 
only seven of the 17 States Parties assessed had provided a high degree of clarity in their 
reporting: Afghanistan, Chile, Ecuador, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, and the UK. 
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #9: APPLICATION OF 
LAND RELEASE METHODOLOGIES
Almost all States Parties that implemented systematic mine clearance programs in 2015 
used land release methodologies (survey and clearance), although the degree to which they 
are aligned with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) varies. The committee called 
on States Parties to align their national mine action standards with the revised IMAS if they 
have not already done so. 
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #11: CALL FOR ON-TIME 
SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY REQUESTS 
In 2016, two states submitted requests on time (Niger and Peru). Ukraine’s intention to 
submit a request was recorded at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 
2015, but the request had still not been submitted as of 15 October 2016. Niger’s request 
lacks the action plan with annual benchmarks that is essential to any good-quality request. 
Peru’s revised request can generally be considered of good quality: it contains consistent 
data and outlines relevant activities with the appropriate bodies in charge of carrying them 
out.30 Jordan, Mozambique, and Nigeria should submit an extension request to address the 
contamination that has been identified after they declared completion of clearance.
MAPUTO ACTION PLAN ACTION #25: CALL FOR THE 
ANNUAL SUBMISSION OF HIGH-QUALITY AND UPDATED 
INFORMATION 
As of 15 October 2016, Article 7 transparency reports for 2015 were still outstanding for 12 
states with contamination: Angola, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Palau, 
Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Yemen. 
OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING CLEARANCE 
OPERATIONS
FUNDING
Mine action experienced a severe reduction in funding in 2015, negatively affecting 
land release results. Inadequate funding was cited as a challenge to achieving Article 5 
implementation deadlines by the following States Parties: Afghanistan,31 Angola,32 Cambodia,33 
29 Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain 
mined areas.
30 See details in Niger and Peru’s respective country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
31 Email from the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA), 1 May 2016.
32 Statement of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), 
Geneva, 19 May 2016; and “CNIDAH says the complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take 
a long time,” Agencia Angola Press (ANGOP), 13 March 2015.
33 “Concept Paper: Cambodian Mine Action Resources Mobilisation,” Cambodian Mine Action and Victim 

















Chad,34 Ethiopia,35 Eritrea,36 Iraq, 37 Niger,38 Senegal,39 and Yemen.40 In Afghanistan, the amount 
of land released in 2015 almost halved from the previous year, due to the downturn in 
funding.41 In South Sudan, despite the fact that 2015 was one of the most productive years 
for land release, operators expressed concern over decreased funding for mine action in 
2015, with donors prioritizing other humanitarian sectors or refusing to fund mine action 
activities while the conflict is ongoing.42 Although DRC43 and Serbia44 can achieve their 
Article 5 deadlines, both States Parties reported funding difficulties. In BiH, it was reported 
that the slow pace of clearance had resulted in a lack of confidence in the mine action 
program from donors.45
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
Almost all Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with contamination have national mine action 
programs or institutions that are assigned to fulfil the state’s clearance obligations. Palau, 
Turkey, and Ukraine are in the process of establishing mine action programs. In Nigeria, 
explosive ordnance disposal is conducted by the army and police. 
In contrast, fewer than half of the states not party have functioning mine action programs.46 
The following 11 states not party do not have mine action programs: China, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, 
Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and Uzbekistan. In India, 
the army decides on clearance based on reports from district commanders. Egypt’s mine 
action program is not functional and the status of Iran’s mine action center is not clear. 
The understanding of the extent of contamination, and the scale of land release efforts, 
is much lower in states not party than in States Parties. This underlines the importance of 
striving for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, in order to address the threat posed by 
antipersonnel mines.
CLEARANCE IN CONFLICT
In 2015 and 2016, conflict affected land release operations in nine States Parties (Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen) and five states not 
party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine, and Syria.)
34 Chad, Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013; email from Julien Kempeneers, Handicap 
International (HI), 2 May 2016.
35 Ethiopia, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2015, pp. 40–41.
36 Statement of Eritrea, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 December 2013.
37 Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 22 May 2016.
38 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013; Executive summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline 
Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2; and Revised Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 
March 2016, p. 14. 
39 Senegal, Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, p. 22.
40 Yemen, Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 15.
41 Email from MACCA, 1 May 2016.
42 Responses to questionnaire by Ismael Frioud, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 9 April 2015; from Augustino 
Seja, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 2 June 2015; and from Rickard Hartmann, Danish Demining Group 
(DDG), 22 May 2015.
43 Statement of DRC, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), 
Geneva, 25 June 2015.
44 Preliminary observations of the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Intersessional 
Meetings, Geneva, 19–20 May 2016; statements of Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States 
Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Committee on Article 5 
Implementation), Geneva, 19 May 2016.
45 UNDP, Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for BiH, 13 May 2015, p. 14.
46 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Vietnam.
In 2015, eight personnel from the Mine Action Program of Afghanistan were killed 
and 34 injured in security incidents, and 63 were abducted and then released.47 In South 
Sudan, two Danish Demining Group (DDG) staff were killed by gunmen.48
Insecurity has also restricted access to some antipersonnel mine-affected areas in 
Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, and Turkey.49
Cyprus does not have effective control of antipersonnel mine-contaminated areas.50 
In Palestine, Israel will not authorize clearance by Palestinians, and most mined areas 
are in zones controlled by Israel or under joint control.51 Ukraine has noted that it does 
not currently have access to some mined areas.52
In Colombia, the peace process between the government and the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) gave 
momentum to demining planning in 2015. However, it remains to be seen what will 
happen after a plebiscite rejected the September 2016 Peace Agreement. 
In Myanmar, the government said that concluding a National Ceasefire Agreement 
with non-state actors was a precondition for proceeding with survey and clearance.53
47 Email from the MACCA, 1 May 2016.
48 Danish Refugee Council, “Two national employees have lost their lives in South Sudan,” 12 April 
2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/two-national-employees-have-lost-their-lives-south-
sudan.
49 “Response to Committee on Article 5 Implementation request for additional information on its 
Article 5 deadline Extension Request,” submitted 26 September 2015; Analysis of Ethiopia’s Article 
5 deadline Extension Request, 19 November 2015, p. 3; Jordan’s Article 5 Declaration of Completion 
2012; email from Mohammad Breikat, National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR), 
25 August 2016; Senegal, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 June 2015; and Turkey, Mine Ban 
Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C.
50 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 December 2015, p. 5
51 Email from the Planning Department, Palestine Mine Action Centre (PMAC), 9 May 2016.
52 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 15 December 2015, p. 9.



























The Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines’ Camilo Serna Villegas delivers certificates for 
beneficiaries of an economic support project at the survivor rehabilitation farm “Granja” in 
Bucaramanga. 
























In 2015, there was a sharp rise in the number of casualties caused by landmines, including 
victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (also called victim-activated improvised 
landmines), as well as cluster munition remnants,1 and other explosive remnants of war 
(ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW. For 2015, the Monitor recorded 6,461 mine/ERW casualties, 
marking a 75% increase from 3,695 casualties recorded for 2014.2 Casualties, the people 
killed and injured by mines/ERW, were identified in a total of 61 states and other areas in 
2015.3
This sharp increase was due to more mine/ERW casualties recorded in armed conflicts in 
Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen in 2015, as compared with previous years. In 2015, there was 
also increased availability of casualty data for persons injured in some countries, particularly 
Libya and Syria. The casualty total in 2015 marked the highest number of annual casualties 
by victim-activated IEDs (also called improvised mines) recorded by the Monitor.
Despite the overall increase, declining casualty rates were recorded in the majority of 
states and other impacted areas. Recorded casualties decreased in 34 countries and areas 
1 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. 
Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are 
reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by 
cluster munitions, see ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/
cluster-munition-monitor-2016/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
2 Landmine Monitor 2015 cited a figure of 3,678 casualties for 2014, but the number of casualties for 2014 
and past years has been adjusted with newly available data.
3 Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, 
Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, 
South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and other areas Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and 
Western Sahara.
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(726 total decrease) compared to 2014, while the number of casualties recorded in 2015 
increased in 31 (3,492 total increase). The group of 34 includes Cambodia and Colombia, two 
States Parties that remain among those with the highest casualties, but for which rates have 
been declining over the past years.4 Together just four countries—Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and 
Yemen—account for an increase of 3,218 casualties from 2014, representing the majority of 
the total annual increase of 3,492 casualties in the group of 31.5
Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (1999–2015)
The spike represented the highest annual total of mine/ERW casualties recorded in a 
decade (since 2006). The 2015 casualty increase of 2,766 more people killed and injured 
than recorded in 2014 also marks the most serious disturbance in an overall trend of 
progressively fewer annually recorded mine/ERW casualties for the period since the Mine 
Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999. This reflects an average incidence rate of almost 18 
mine/ERW casualties per day in 2015, compared to 10 casualties per day in 2014. However, 
in 1999 there were 25 mine/ERW casualties per day on average.6
The Monitor has recorded more than 100,000 mine/ERW casualties for the 17-year period 
since its global tracking in began in 1999,7 including some 73,000 new survivors.8 Mine/
ERW incidents impact not only the direct casualties—the boys, girls, women, and men who 
were killed, as well as the survivors—but also members of their families struggling under 
new physical, psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous years, there was no 
substantial data available on the numbers of those people indirectly impacted as a result of 
mine/ERW casualties.
4 Decreases were recorded in Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, 
Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Vietnam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and three 
other areas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland.
5 Casualties increased in Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Poland, South Korea, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen, and two other areas, Abkhazia and Western 
Sahara.  The number in the Philippines and Albania remained the same.
6 In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties. 
7 From 1999 through 2015, 102,970 mine/ERW casualties were recorded, including 26,230 people killed, 
72,739 injured, and 4,001 for whom their survival or the deadly outcome of the explosive incident was 
not known.






























































Of the total of 6,461 mine/ERW casualties the Monitor recorded for 2015, at least 1,670 
people were killed and another 4,785 people were injured; for six casualties, it was not 
known if the injured person survived. This was the lowest figure for unknown outcome of 
injury or death for annual mine/ERW casualties since Monitor recording began in 1999. 
Civilians represented the vast majority of casualties as compared to military and security 
forces,9 where the civilian status was known, continuing a clear trend of civilian harm over 
time: 78% in 2015—similar to the 80% of civilian casualties recorded in 2014 and almost 
identical to the 79% recorded for 2013.10
Some three-quarters (74%, or 4,755) of all mine/ERW casualties 
recorded for 2015 occurred in five states, all of which are conflict-
affected: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Afghanistan, Ukraine, and 
Yemen, as well as states not party Syria and Libya. 
Of the total casualties, 61% (3,935) occurred among 51 Mine Ban 
Treaty States Parties, compared to 71% (2,610) in 37 States Parties 
recorded for 2014.11
Afghanistan continued to record the highest number of casualties 
in 2015, although the annual total for the country remained almost 
the same, with just 14 casualties more than in 2014.
Several significant country-level increases in annual casualty 
totals in 2015 were influenced in part by progress, albeit likely 
temporary advances, in data collection despite conflict and insecurity. 
Of the 1,004 total mine/ERW casualties for Libya in 2015, 982 
were recorded in the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) database.12 
The vast majority of these casualties—935 persons reported injured 
by ERW—were recorded during surveys at two hospitals in Tripoli.13 
Those hospitals do not have reliable and updated databases, therefore 
casualty numbers were likely under-reported.14 
In Syria, a significant increase in mine/ERW casualties in 2015 
was influenced by the availability of data from an extensive survey 
project of conflict-injured persons, including refugees. Syria had 864 
recorded casualties in 2015, compared to 174 in 2014. The majority 
of mine/ERW casualties for 2015 (551) were from records of persons injured compiled and 
recorded as casualties of unspecified mines by Handicap International (HI) in data on the 
needs of conflict survivors.15 This marked the first time since the beginning of the conflict 
that a substantial dataset on persons injured by mines/ERW in Syria was available. Data 
on injured persons was collected through interviews with displaced people and refugees 
9 Security forces can include police as well members of non-state armed groups and militia.
10 In 2015, the civilian status was not recorded in data for 41% of the reported casualties (2,652). For 2014, 
in comparison, the number of casualties without reported civilian status was just 3% (118 casualties).
11 Casualties were identified in the following States Parties in 2015: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Djibouti, 
El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
12 Another 22 casualties were identified through Monitor media scanning for calendar year 2015. LibMAC 
data listed an additional 340 IED casualties that were not included in Monitor records: 66 emplaced 
IED casualties that did not indicate if the devices were command-detonated or victim-activated; and 
casualties caused by person-detonated (suicide bombers) and vehicle-borne IEDs (car/truck bombs).
13 Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by Abdullatif H.M. Abujarida, IMSMA Manager, LibMAC, 23 May 
2016; and Monitor media scanning for 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015.
14 Hospitals made the identification of the cause of injury. Some casualties recorded as due to ERW may 
have been casualties of IEDs. Email from Anne Barthes, Handicap International (HI), 26 May 2016. 
15 Casualty data from Regional Emergency Response Office on the Syrian Crisis – HI, 27 May 2016.
States with 100 or more 
recorded casualties  
in 2015












Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban 
Treaty are indicated in bold.
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in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.16 Detailed data on fatalities was collected and disaggregated 
according to the weapons involved by the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) 
and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).17
In Yemen, there were 988 mines/ERW casualties identified in 2015, the majority (812) 
reported by the ICRC as having been admitted to healthcare facilities in the calendar year.18 
ICRC data was not disaggregated by age or gender; however, the ICRC noted that most 
casualties were male.19 In 2014, the Monitor identified 24 casualties from mines/ERW. The 
ICRC reported just five mine/ERW casualties receiving treatment in 2014.20
Due to ongoing conflict in Iraq, the number of mine/ERW casualties continued to be 
significantly under-recorded. Only 58 mine/ERW casualties were recorded in Iraq, and as 
in past years, the number is thought to be much higher. Unlike in Afghanistan where the 
UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) records data more completely,21 a complete 
lack of disaggregation between command-detonated IEDs, including emplaced, body-borne, 
and vehicle-borne devices, and presumably victim-activated IEDs meant that the number of 
mine casualties remained obscured in Iraq.22 In south and central Iraq, data for 2015 cluster 
munition casualties were not disaggregated due to the difficulties caused by continuing 
military operations against the so-called Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or ISIL) 
preventing mine action casualty data recording coordination with relevant authorities in 
order to classify and complete the data.23 
As in previous years, the mine/ERW casualties identified in 2015 only include recorded 
casualties, not estimates. Based on the Monitor research methodology in place since 2009, it 
has been estimated that there are up to approximately 25–30% additional casualties each 
year that are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most 
occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict.
16 Data on injured persons was collected by HI and partners through interviews with displaced people and 
refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon between June 2013 and December 2015. The reporting is based on 
interviews with 68,049 people assessed by HI teams, of which 25,097 were injured: 14,471 in Syria, 7,823 
in Jordan, and 2,803 in Lebanon. See, HI factsheet, “Syria: A mutilated future,” Brussels, May 2016, pp. 1–2, 
bit.ly/HISyriaMay2016; and HI, “New Report: Syrians Maimed and Traumatized by Explosive Weapons,” 20 
June 2016, bit.ly/HISyriaJune2016. 
17 The SNHR also documented a number of people injured by cluster munitions when that information 
was available. SNHR, “Four Years Harvest: The Use of Cluster Ammunition…That is Still Going,” 30 March 
2015, http://sn4hr.org/blog/2015/03/30/5346/; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, 
Director, SNHR, 8 June 2016.
18 The 812 mine/ERW survivors were among of 28,565 weapon-wounded persons in total admitted to ICRC-
supported healthcare facilities in 2015. ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 526; and email from 
Rima Kamal, ICRC Yemen, 7 June 2016.
19 ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 526; and email from Rima Kamal, ICRC Yemen, 7 June 2016. 
20 ICRC, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, May 2015, p. 515.
21 For Afghanistan UNAMA categorizes IEDs by the basic method used to initiate detonation, including 
victim-activated IEDs, remote control/radio/command-operated IEDs, and suicide IEDs. The most common 
victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan are pressure plate IEDs, which are improvised landmines.
22 According to a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) report, all types of IEDs collectively were reported 
to have caused 7,086 civilian casualties (1,717 killed and 5,369 injured) in Iraq during the period 1 May 
to 31 October 2015, but none of these casualties are included in Monitor reporting because they are not 
disaggregated by IED type. See UNAMAI monthly reports on protection of civilians; and UNAMI/OCHA, 
“Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015,” January 
2016, bit.ly/UNAMIMayOct2015. iMMAP (an independent organization once part of the former Vietnam 
Veterans of America Foundation’s Information Management and Mine Action Programs) reported that 
IEDs killed 7,525 and injured 12,751 from January 2014 to January 2016, but victim-activated IEDs were 
not disaggregated in the data. Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 1,190 IED casualties in Iraq for 
2015; 23 military and security forces and eight civilian casualties were caused by booby-traps but these 
were not marked specifically as victim-activated IED incidents. Another two were killed by a device that 
was recorded as victim-activated, while laying the IED, and were therefore not included in the Monitor 
total. The Monitor has requested disaggregated data on IED casualties from relevant UN agencies, mine 
action centers, and iMMAP.




















The level of under-reporting of casualties 
has declined over time, as many countries have 
initiated and improved casualty data-collection 
mechanisms and the sharing of this data. In 2015, 
the number of casualties missed in national 
annual reporting was likely reduced in some 
countries experiencing conflict, thus contributing 
to a higher global casualty total. Nonetheless, in 
many states and areas, numerous casualties go 
unrecorded; therefore the true casualty figure is 
likely significantly higher in some countries.
CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS24
There were at least 1,072 child casualties in 2015. 
Child casualties in 2015 accounted for 38% of all 
civilian casualties for whom the age was known.25 
This was similar to the 39% recorded for 2014 and 
for 2012, but a significant decrease from many 
past years, including 2013 with 46%. Children 
were killed (343) and injured (704) by mines/ERW 
in 36 countries and other areas in 2015.26
As in previous years, in 2015 the vast majority 
of child casualties where the sex was known were 
boys (82%).27
ERW caused the most child casualties (456, 
or 43%), followed by victim-activated improvised 
mines (319, or 30%). For more information on child 
casualties and assistance see the annual Monitor 
fact sheet on landmines/ERW and children.
In 2015, female casualties made up 14% of all 
casualties for which the sex was known (546 of 
3,986).28
In 2015, there were 46 casualties identified 
among deminers (six deminers were killed and 40 
injured) in 10 states.29 This represented a similar 
finding as for 2014, when 53 deminer casualties 
were recorded in 10 states. It was, however, about 
half of the average of 105 casualties among 
deminers per year since 1999.
24 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties to the extent 
that data is available and disaggregated.
25 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18-years of age at the time of 
the incident.
26 Child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Chad, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and two other areas, Somaliland and Western Sahara.
27 There were 829 boys and 180 girls recorded as casualties in 2015; the sex of 63 child casualties was not 
recorded.
28 For 2,435 casualties the sex was not known.
29 In 2015, casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Iran, 





Note: This includes only the civilian 
casualties for which the age was known.
Mine/ERW casualties by age 
in 2015
Mine/ERW casualties by sex 
in 2015
Note: This includes only the casualties  
for which the sex was known.
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Between 1999 and 2015, the Monitor 
identified more than 1,600 deminers who 
were killed or injured while undertaking 
clearance operations.30
Civilian casualties represented 78% 
of casualties in 2015 where the civilian/
military status was known (2,990 of 
3,809). 
The countries with the most military 
casualties in 2015 were Ukraine (273) 
and Colombia (158). Mali, with 72 military 
casualties (including peacekeeping 
forces), was the third highest. The next 
highest numbers of military casualties in 
2015 were in Syria (64) and Pakistan (57).
MINES/ERW CAUSING CASUALTIES
In 2015, landmines—including factory-made antipersonnel mines (509, or 8%), victim-
activated improvised mines (1,331, or 21%), antivehicle mines (468, or 7%), and unspecified 
mine types (934, or 14%)—caused the majority of all casualties (3,233, or 50% combined). 
Unexploded submunitions caused 76 casualties (or 1%) and other ERW 1,791 casualties (or 
28%). Unknown mine/ERW items caused 1,352 casualties, or 21% of the annual total.
Casualties by type of explosive device in 2014 and 201531
30 There were 1,675 casualties among deminers from 1999 through 2015. Since 1999, the annual number 
of demining casualties identified has fluctuated greatly, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major 
fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data 
from a particular country in any given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in 
operating procedures, international demining standards, or demining equipment.
31 The explosive device type was not known for 1,352 casualties (21% of the total) in 2015, and for 279 
casualties (8%) in 2014: see analysis in this section. The number of recorded cluster submunition 
casualties (76, including two in South Sudan not yet counted when Cluster Munition Monitor 2016 was 
published) is likely much lower than the actual number because ERW data often does not differentiate by 
weapon type. See, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cluster-
munition-monitor-2016/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
Note: This includes only the casualties for which the civilian /military 
status was known.





























































































Antipersonnel mine A munition designed to exploded by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person, 
and therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban 
Treaty
Antivehicle mine Also referred to as “antitank mines,” 
and included among mines other than 
antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM), are designed 
to be detonated by the presence, proximity, 
or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that 
of a person and tend to contain a larger 
explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. 
Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under 
the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted 
with fuses that can be detonated by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person 
Victim-activated IEDs Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are 
“homemade” explosive weapons that are 
designed to cause death or injury. Victim-
activated IEDs are detonated by the 
presence, proximity, or contact of a person 
or a vehicle. Victim-activated IEDs are 
landmines and are sometimes referred to as 
homemade mines, victim-operated IEDs  
(VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, 
such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). 
In Monitor casualty reporting, the terms 
“victim-activated improvised mine” or 











Antipersonnel victim-activated IEDs, 
including booby-traps that can be detonated 
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person, fit the definition of antipersonnel 
landmines and are therefore prohibited 
under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap 
is an antipersonnel explosive device 
deliberately placed to cause casualties when 
an apparently harmless object is disturbed or 
a normally safe act is performed
Unspecified mine 
types
When reported as a “mine” or “landmine” 
incident, but the information to distinguish 
if it was an antipersonnel or an antivehicle 






Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or 
released by, or otherwise separated from, a 
cluster munition and failed to explode or that 
have not been used and that have been left 
behind or dumped; may include casualties of 




(other) ERW Unexploded ordnance 
(UXO)
Explosive weapons that have been primed, 
fused, armed, or otherwise prepared for use 
or used. It may have been fired, dropped, 




Explosive weapons that have not been used 





explosive items, type 
unknown 
Unknown mine/ERW are explosive items 
causing casualties that were detonated by 
the presence, proximity, or contact of a person 
or a vehicle that were not attributed to a 
specific mine/ERW type either because it was 
not known what type of mine or ERW caused 
the casualty when information was recorded, 
or due to a lack of disaggregation between 
victim-activated explosives and ERW causing 
casualties within a dataset, including when 
mine/ERW casualties are differentiated as 
such from other weapon victims
Note: * The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of victim-activated antipersonnel IEDs are 
prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed 
under, on or near the ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed 
to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person…” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited 
under the Mine Ban Treaty unless the fuzing allows them to be activated by a person.
** In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish between antivehicle and antipersonnel victim-
activated IEDs because reporting, which occurs after an explosion, does not provide a clear means 
of determining the sensitivity of fuzes in the overwhelming majority of cases. The information that 
is available indicates that the fuzing of most victim-activated IEDs causing casualties allows them 
to be activated by a person (as well as a vehicle), and therefore banned by the Treaty. As a shorthand, 
the Monitor at times simply uses the term “improvised mine” to encompass any improvised victim-
activated IED because they are likely to function as antipersonnel mines, rather than meeting the 
fuzing sensitivity to be strictly antivehicle.
The  1,331 victim-activated IED/improvised mine casualties recorded for 2015 was the 
highest annual total of such casualties recorded since 1999, the next highest number recorded 
was 1,169 in 2012. Casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in 13 states in 
2015.32 Historically, the number of  victim-activated IED casualties was under-reported 
because such casualties were included in data as caused by unspecified mine types and 
unknown mine/ERW items. Starting in 2008, the Monitor began identifying more casualties 
from these improvised antipersonnel mines, likely due in part to an increase in their use and 
also to improved data collection that made it possible to better discern between factory-
made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs, and between command-detonated 
IEDs and victim-activated IEDs in some countries. However, casualties of improvised 
antipersonnel mines in Colombia33 are recorded as antipersonnel landmine casualties by the 
mine action authorities and for consistency this definition is retained in Monitor reporting, 
there being no functional need for reclassification. Casualties of improvised antipersonnel 
32 Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and 
Ukraine.




















mines in Myanmar, Yemen, and Ukraine34 are also likely to be included among those recorded 
as antipersonnel landmine casualties.
Casualties recorded as due to unspecified mine types increased significantly from 329 
in 2014 to 934 in 2015. This was mostly attributable to 719 casualties in the data for Syria, 
making up 77% of the catergory in 2015, likely due to nonspecific default categorization 
of different types of mine/ERW casualties as “landmine casualties.” The remaining 219 
casualties of unspecified mine types were recorded in 10 states.35 
Casualties recorded as caused by antipersonnel mines decreased from 640 in 2014 to 509 
in 2015, with the greatest decreases reported in Colombia, from 251 in 2014 to 208 (down 
17%); Myanmar, from 100 in 2014 to 66 (down 34%); Afghanistan, from 52 to 13 (down 75%); 
and Cambodia, from 37 in 2014 to 13 (down 65%). At least 40 antipersonnel mine casualties 
were reported for Ukraine.  
In 2015, antivehicle mines caused at least 468 casualties in 18 states and other areas.36 
The states with the greatest numbers of casualties reported from antivehicle mines were 
Ukraine (147), Pakistan (73), and Syria (68). In 2014, antivehicle mines caused 218 casualties.37
In 2015, the number of casualties of unknown mine/ERW items in the Monitor global 
total jumped to 1,352, compared to just 279 in 2014. For 2015, 69% (932) of all casualties of 
unknown mine/ERW items were recorded in Yemen, where most such injured persons were 
documented under a general default category of mine/ERW casualties in injury surveillance 
data.38 The remaining 420 casualties of unknown mine/ERW items occurred in 14 countries 
and one other area.39 In 2015, 28% of all casualties (1,791) were caused by ERW in 40 
states and areas. Although there may have been some default categorization of mine/ERW 
casualties as ERW casualties in Libya (as noted above) in 2014, similarly 27% of all casualties 
were caused by ERW.40 Children (453) made up 59% of ERW casualties in 2015, when the age 
group was recorded.41
34 From media reporting it was often not possible to distinguish between tripwire mines and improvised 
antipersonnel mines made from a tripwire and hand grenade, which were prolifically causing casualties. 
In many cases, the Monitor recorded these casualties as caused by antipersonnel landmines.
35 In 2015, unspecified mine casualties were recorded in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Niger, 
Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen.
36 In 2015, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia, Cyprus, Egypt, Georgia, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Pakistan, South Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, 
and Yemen, and three other areas, Abkhazia, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
37 The Monitor shares, cross-references, and compares data with the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-vehicle mines 
(AVM) project. That project recorded 598 casualties from both confirmed (388) and suspected (210) 
antivehicle mines in 25 countries in 2015. While much of the data matches with the Monitor data, each of 
the methodologies used to enter data differ, resulting in the discrepancies in annual casualties reported. 
For example, Monitor data does not include casualties that occur while engaged in laying mines. Monitor 
reporting does include politically disputed geographic “other areas” in reporting, and tends to use the 
definitions employed in original whole data sets when possible. Casualty data provided by email from 
Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 11 July 2016. See also, GICHD-SIPRI, “Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents 
Map,” undated, www.gichd.org/avm - ch18738.
38 Those also made up the vast majority of the 988 casualties recorded for Yemen in 2015.
39 Unknown device casualties were recorded in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, Philippines, 
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen, and one other area, Western Sahara.
40 In 2015, casualties from ERW were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and Vietnam, and four other areas, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, 
and Western Sahara. In addition to other types of ERW, casualties of unexploded submunitions were 
identified in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, and two other 
areas, Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara. For more information on casualties caused by unexploded 
submunitions and the annual increase in those casualties recorded for the year 2015, see ICBL-CMC, 
Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cluster-munition-monitor-2016/
casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
41 Of the total ERW casualties in 2015, 326 were adults and 970 were without a reported age group.
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States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2015
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Americas









































































Note: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties indicated in bold; other areas in italics.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
The Mine Ban Treaty has made progress, but has not yet attained its ultimate goal of 
alleviating human suffering caused by landmines. Importantly, it is the first disarmament or 
humanitarian law treaty in which States Parties commit to provide “assistance for the care 
and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration” of those people harmed 
by a specific type of weapon.42
Victim assistance aims to achieve comprehensive rehabilitation of survivors and the full 
inclusion of survivors and their families in wider society, as well as ensuring that the same 
assistance is available to affected communities. That assistance includes: data collection 
and needs assessment with referral to emergency and continuing medical care; physical 
rehabilitation, including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological support; 
social and economic inclusion; and the adoption or adjustment of relevant laws and public 
policies. Preferably, such assistance is to be provided through a comprehensive approach 
comprised of all of the above elements.
Victim assistance, in practice, addresses the overlapping and interconnected needs of 
persons with disabilities, including survivors43 of landmines, cluster munitions, explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), and other weapons, as well as people in their communities with 
similar requirements for assistance. In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach family 
members of casualties or those who have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due to mines/
ERW. All of these people are considered “mine victims” according to the accepted definition 
of the term, which includes survivors as well as affected families and communities44—
42 Mine Ban Treaty, Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/.
43 A “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.




















although to date most victim assistance efforts have targeted survivors and other persons 
with disabilities.
In June 2014, at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, States Parties adopted 
and committed to the Maputo Action Plan, which includes a set of actions that would 
advance victim assistance through to 2019.45 States Parties recognized that completion of 
mine clearance obligations “is within reach.” They also formally declared that they remain 
very much aware of their “enduring obligations to mine victims.”46 Victim assistance is an 
ongoing responsibility in all states with survivors and affected communities, including those 
countries that are mine-affected and those that have been declared mine-free. 
While specific victim assistance efforts have been demonstrated to benefit survivors and 
other persons with disabilities, it has been noted that “there is little evidence that broader 
development, human rights and humanitarian efforts also reach victims.”47  The Maputo 
Action Plan and provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions indicate that a long-
term solution to addressing the needs of victims involves “an integrated approach to victim 
assistance” whereby:
  Specific victim assistance efforts act as a catalyst to advance 
the inclusion and well-being of survivors, other persons with 
disabilities, indirect victims and other vulnerable groups; and
  Broader efforts reach victims amongst overall 
beneficiaries.48
This dual approach is to be implemented until such time 
as “mainstream efforts” are demonstrated to be inclusive of, 
and fulfil the obligations that states have to, survivors and 
indirect victims.49
As shown by the many successful practices and activities 
over time, victim assistance is not inherently complicated.50 
However, many challenges do remain to ensure access 
to sustainable services, to remove the barriers to the full 
participation of survivors and indirect victims in their societies, 
and to create tangible improvements in their wellbeing and 
quality of life. 
The Monitor has tracked the progress of programs and 
45 “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-
RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf.
46 MAPUTO +15, Declaration of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, adopted 27 June 2014.
47 Convention on Cluster Munitions Coordinators of the Working Group on Victim  Assistance and the 
Coordinators of the Working Group on Cooperation and Assistance, “Guidance on an integrated approach 
to victim assistance,” (CCM/MSP/2016/WP.2), 11 July 2016, bit.ly/IntegratedApproachGuidance2016.
48 Such as national laws, policies, and plans on issues such as health, disability, education, labor, 
transportation, social welfare, rural development, poverty reduction, and overseas development 
assistance
49 Convention on Cluster Munitions Coordinators of the Working Group on Victim  Assistance and the 
Coordinators of the Working Group on  Cooperation and Assistance, “Guidance on an integrated approach 
to victim assistance,” (CCM/MSP/2016/WP.2), 11 July 2016, bit.ly/IntegratedApproachGuidance2016. See 
also: statement of Thailand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 
6 September 2016, in which Thailand welcomes the Workshop on an Integrated Approach to Victim 
Assistance; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Implementation Support Unit (ISU), “Workshop on 
an Integrated Approach to Victim Assistance,” (including workshop documents) 27 May 2016, www.
clusterconvention.org/2016/05/27/workshop-on-an-integrated-approach-to-victim-assistance.
50 See, “Assisting the Victims: Recommendations on Implementing the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014,” 
Presented to the Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference by Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee 
on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Belgium and Thailand, Cartagena, Colombia, 30 
November 2009, bit.ly/CartegenaPlanVA; and “Parallel Programme – Victim Assistance,” which contains 
links to information from such programm between 2007 and 2012, victim-assistance.org/about/victim-
assistance-resources/pp.
Najma Mohammed Xaamud speaks about the 
challenges of assisting persons with disablities 
in Somalia and urges government and 
community action at a seminar in Mogadishu.
© Somali Campaign to Ban Landmines, February 
2016
54 
activities that benefit mine/ERW survivors, families, and communities under the Mine Ban 
Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans since 1999. This overview reports on the 
year 2015, with relevant updates into October 2016 when available. It covers the activities 
and achievements in 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of 
mine/ERW victims in need of assistance.51
Monitor reporting demonstrates that it will require active cooperation and stronger 
determination to overcome challenges and allocate the resources necessary to address the 
enduring obligations of victim assistance. Dedicated funding for victim assistance, which 
has, in practice, contributed to fulfilling the rights of survivors and other persons with 
disabilities, has been declining. Other frameworks that could address the rights and needs 
of victims, including disability-inclusive development and poverty reduction efforts, have 
not yet been able to ensure the sustainability of such assistance or mitigate the impact 
of shrinking resources. As stated by Thailand, Chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on 
Victim Assistance, “Victim assistance requires long-term and continual efforts on the part of 
States to support all victims.”52












































TREATY MACHINERY AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE
According to Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan, all States Parties will seize every 
opportunity to raise awareness of the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the 
rights of mine victims. A Committee on Victim Assistance was formed at the Mine Ban Treaty’s 
Third Review Conference in Maputo with the purpose to “support States Parties in their 
national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance.” The committee is mandated to 
ensure a balance between ongoing discussions on victim assistance within the framework 
of the Mine Ban Treaty itself. It is also tasked with taking the discussion on meeting the 
51 This corresponds with Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan. The Monitor reports on the following 
31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in which there are significant numbers of survivors: Afghanistan, Albania, 
Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-
Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This list includes 29 States Parties that have indicated 
that they have significant numbers of survivors for which they must provide care, as well as Algeria and 
Turkey, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of survivors in their official landmine clearance 
deadline (Mine Ban Treaty Article 5) extension request submissions. Algeria, Mine Ban Treaty Revised 
Article 5 Extension Request, 31 March 2011, bit.ly/AlgeriaExtension2011; and Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty 
Article 5 Extension Request, 28 March 2013, bit.ly/TurkeyExtension2013.
52 Statement of Thailand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 
September 2016.
53 In addition, States Parties Mali and Ukraine, both of which have had hundreds of mine/ERW casualties 
in the past two years, may be considered to have significant numbers of survivors with great needs for 




















needs and guaranteeing the rights of mine victims to fora of other frameworks that address 
relevant issues, including those related to disarmament and disability rights.54
The committee, and Thailand in particular, took an active role in promoting victim 
assistance inside and outside the treaty. For example, the Bangkok Symposium on Landmine 
Victim Assistance: Enhancing a Comprehensive and Sustainable Mine Action, held on 
15–17 June 2015 in Bangkok, was organized in collaboration with the Mine Ban Treaty 
Implementation Support Unit. A side event on the margins of the intersessional meetings 
in Geneva in May 2016 explored “gold standards” in assistance. In September 2016, the 
Committee on Victim Assistance held a side event during the 33rd session of the Human 
Rights Council entitled “Promoting mine victims’ rights: making their rights real,” to 
encourage the sharing of experiences and challenges in integrating victim assistance into 
broader human rights and disability frameworks and across relevant conventions. 
COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES
In 2015–2016, collaboration between the Mine Ban Treaty and relevant disarmament 
conventions was strengthened. The Chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Victim 
Assistance told Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties that it “would be pleased to 
work with Coordinators on Victim Assistance under [the] Convention on Cluster Munitions to 
bridge the gap between the two conventions by exchanging information and updating work 
plans with each other.”55
In February 2016, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Victim Assistance held a meeting 
with the Victim Assistance Coordinators of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Protocol 
V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to share information and to strengthen 
collaboration. In May 2016, the Convention on Cluster Munitions Coordinators on Victim 
Assistance and Coordinators on Cooperation and Assistance invited Mine Ban Treaty Victim 
Assistance Coordinators and States Parties to participate in the development of guidance 
for states by states on an “integrated approach to victim assistance,” being undertaken with 
technical support from Handicap International.56
Further reflecting the improving orientation toward rights-based assistance, in 2015 
the ICRC, for the first time, issued a Special Appeal on Disability and Mine Action. Whereas 
previously related ICRC special appeals had particularly focused on preventative activities 
in mine action, the appeal for 2016 acknowledges the increased international attention on 
issues of disability inclusion attributable to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD). It draws on the ICRC’s adjusted operational framework orientation of 
2014 that is specifically inclusive of the needs of all persons with disabilities.57
Also, in 2016, the UN issued an expanded policy on victim assistance in mine action.58 
This policy, which “intends to generate a renewed impetus and commitment from the United 
Nations in support of mine and ERW victims,” draws on the expertise of UN agencies and 
programs, the ICBL, NGOs, mine action program managers, experts, and donor countries.59
54 “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.
maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.
55 Statement of Thailand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 6 
September 2016.
56 Statement of Australia (Speaking as Coordinator on Victim Assistance for the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions), Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
57 ICRC, “Special Appeal 2016: Disability and Mine Action,” Geneva, December 2015, www.icrc.org/sites/
default/files/topic/file_plus_list/disability_mine2016_rex2015_651_final.pdf.
58 “The United Nations Policy on Victim Assistance in Mine Action (2016 Update),” bit.ly/UNMineActionVA2016.
59 UNMAS, “Issues: Victim Assistance,” www.mineaction.org/issues/victimassistance.
56 
In September 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were agreed at a UN 
summit. The SDGs are a set of 17 goals with targets and indicators that all UN member states 
are expected to use to frame policies and stimulate action for positive change over the period 
from 2015 to 2030. They are designed to address the economic, social, and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development. With an emphasis on poverty reduction, equality, 
and inclusion, the SDGs also recognize the need for the “achievement of durable peace 
and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations.” Therefore, 
the SDGs are generally complementary to the abovementioned aims of the CRPD, the Mine 
Ban Treaty, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and offer opportunities for bridging 
between the relevant frameworks as outlined by the Maputo Action Plan.
Persons with disabilities are referred to directly in several goals: education (Goal 4), 
employment (Goal 8), reducing inequality (Goal 10), and accessibility of human settlements 
(Goal 11), in addition to including persons with disabilities in data collection and monitoring 
(Goal 17). Pragmatically, victim assistance is fully compatible with the SDGs and thus scarce 
resources for victim assistance should be maintained and can be considered an effective 
contribution to the achievement of the SDGs.
Much remains to be done, of course. Speaking at a special high-level victim assistance 
session during the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2015, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pointed out potential 
future challenges to the success of development goals:
The Sustainable Development Goals offer a great opportunity for all, including 
for persons with disabilities. However, the limited capacity to implement and 
measure the level of impact of the SDGs is a risk that must be addressed in order 
to avoid another failure of the development agenda in relation to persons with 
disabilities.60
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAPUTO ACTION PLAN BY 
STATES PARTIES
The Maputo Action Plan provides a framework that allows States Parties to qualitatively 
assess progress in victim assistance, which they can attribute to the relevant actions that they 
take, even in the absence of existing measurable baselines. It calls for activities addressing 
the specific needs of victims while also emphasizing the necessity of simultaneously 
integrating victim assistance into other frameworks by incorporating relevant actions into 
the appropriate sectors, including disability, health, social welfare, education, employment, 
development, and poverty reduction.61 States Parties commit to addressing victim assistance 
objectives “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention.”62
The actions of the Maputo Action Plan can be summarized as follows:
  Assess the needs; evaluate the availability and gaps in services; support efforts to 
make referrals to existing services.
  Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
  Ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their 
representative organizations in all matters that affect them; enhance capacity.
  Increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social 
protection measures; strengthen local capacities and enhance coordination.
  Address the needs and guarantee rights in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.
  Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives annually.
  Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next review conference.
60 Statement by Catalina Devandas Aguilar, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 30 November 2015.
61 Actions #12 to #18 of the Maputo Action Plan.




















The Maputo Action Plan also affirms the need for States Parties to continue carrying 
out the actions of the previous Cartagena Action Plan, which sought to make assistance 
available, affordable, accessible, and sustainable.63
ASSESSING THE NEEDS
States Parties should assess needs for victim assistance—including through sex- and age-
disaggregated data—and gauge the availability of services required, including though 
barrier assessments. They should also use this assessment activity as an opportunity to 
make referrals to existing services.64 No nationwide victim or survivor needs assessments 
were reported in 2015. 
Some specific survey activities and assessments of needs of survivors or victims in 2015–
2016 included the following. In Albania, an assessment of socio-economic and medical 
needs of marginalized ERW survivors carried out during 2013–2016 was completed. In 
Cambodia, village-level quality of life assessments for survivors and other persons with 
disabilities continued. In Colombia, data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims was 
ongoing, and in June 2015, the deadline expired for the registration of persons victimized 
between 1 January 1985 and 10 June 2011 into the national database on conflict victims 
who can receive state assistance. Croatia continued to make progress in the development 
of a unified database on casualties of mine/ERW survivors and their families. In Serbia, 
the ministry responsible for victim assistance worked with other government institutions 
to improve coordination on data and needs assessment. In Darfur, Sudan, work continued 
with disabled peoples’ organizations (DPOs) to identify, through individual case studies, the 
needs of landmine and ERW survivors. In Tajikistan, ICRC needs assessment continued and 
information was entered into the national database to be shared with relevant stakeholders. 
Thailand reported that data collection on mine/ERW survivors was relatively advanced and 
that survivors are included in disability assessments. In Yemen, more mine/ERW victims were 
registered with the mine action center through ongoing survey conducted jointly with the 
national survivor association.
ENHANCING PLANS, POLICIES, AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Coordination
States Parties committed to enhancing coordination activities in order to increase the 
availability and accessibility of services that are relevant to mine victims.65 In 2015 and into 
2016, 21 of the 31 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms or 
disability coordination mechanisms that considered the issues relating to the needs of mine/
ERW survivors.66 (See infographic at the end of this chapter.)
Among the States Parties with active victim assistance coordination in 2015, almost all 
the national coordination mechanisms were reported to have either collaborated with, or 
been included as part of, an active disability coordination mechanism. 
In the following 13 States Parties, the national bodies in charge of coordinating victim 
assistance67 collaborated with those in charge of coordinating disability rights: Afghanistan, 
63 “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 
11 December 2009 (hereafter referred to as the “Cartagena Action Plan”), www.cartagenasummit.org/
fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf.
64 According to Action #12 of the Maputo Action Plan.
65 According to the ongoing Cartagena Action Plan victim assistance commitments and supported by 
Action#15 of the Maputo Action Plan.
66 The states with coordination mechanisms were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen (largely inactive due to conflict).
67 Including coordination bodies for war victims more broadly.
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Albania, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Jordan, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, 
and Thailand. Such coordination mechanisms were also in place in Algeria and Yemen, but 
they did not hold any meetings in 2015. Ad hoc meetings were held in BiH. Victim assistance 
coordination continued in Yei county in South Sudan.
Victim assistance was included in mechanisms for coordination of disability issues, without 
a separate victim assistance coordination body, in five States Parties: Cambodia, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Tajikistan. In DRC and Uganda, the disability mechanisms with 
responsibility for victim assistance coordination did not meet in 2015.
No active coordination mechanism was reported in Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nicaragua, 
Senegal, Somalia, Turkey, Uganda, or Zimbabwe. Turkey had a National Mine Center with a 
mandate for coordinating victim assistance that existed from January 2015 until mid-2016, but 
no activities or collaboration with national disability coordination mechanisms were reported.
Plans and objectives
Actions #13 and #14 of the Maputo Action Plan call on States Parties to have time-bound 
and measurable objectives to implement national policies and plans that will tangibly 
contribute to the main goals of victim assistance.
In 2015, of the States Parties with significant numbers of survivors, 16 had current and 
ongoing plans with objectives that address the needs and promote the rights of mine 
survivors.68 Plans for Burundi, Croatia, Senegal, and Uganda expired in 2014 without yet 
having been renewed. A new National Disability Action Plan for Afghanistan remained 
pending, but was under development. Algeria had developed a victim assistance plan that 
was pending official approval in 2016. A revision of the victim assistance plan for Chad, 
which was extended due to a lack of resources and inactivity, was slated to take place in 
2016. In Yemen, implementation of the plan remained on hold due to armed conflict. 
Actions responding to some needs of mine survivors have been incorporated into the 
national disability plans in Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Serbia, and South Sudan. These 
states did not have a distinct victim assistance plan. 
Colombia, Mozambique, Peru, and Tajikistan had both a national victim assistance plan 
and disability plans and policies that take into account the needs and rights of mine/ERW 
survivors.69 Mozambique adopted its victim assistance strategy, as an addition to its disability 
strategy, in December 2015. In August 2016, a Workshop for Development of National Victim 
Assistance Strategic Framework was held in Sudan.
AVAILABILITY OF AND ACCESSIBILITY TO SERVICES 
Action #15 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to “increase availability of 
and accessibility to appropriate comprehensive rehabilitation services, economic inclusion 
opportunities and social protection measures…including expanding quality services in rural 
and remote areas and paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.”
Updates on the availability and accessibility of comprehensive rehabilitation for mine/
ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities are included in separate reporting 
produced by the Monitor.70 This Monitor reporting on access, inclusion, and rights in 33 
68 Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, 
Mozambique, Peru, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen. States with no plan or expired plans: Afghanistan, 
DRC, Croatia, Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. No 
plans were reported for the remaining States Parties.
69 In Colombia and El Salvador, planning of mine/ERW victim assistance was also integrated into efforts to 
address the needs of armed conflict victims more generally. 
70 See also, ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2015: Inclusion and Rights in 33 Countries,” 2 December 2015, www.the-
monitor.org/media/2155496/Equal-Basis-2015.pdf; and ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights 





















countries, organized under the sub-thematic title “Equal Basis,”71 presents progress in the 
relevant States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions72 in the 
context of the CRPD. 
The Monitor website includes detailed country profiles examining progress in victim 
assistance in some 70 countries, including both States Parties and states not party to the Mine 
Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.73 A collection of thematic overviews, 
briefing papers, factsheets, and infographics related to victim assistance produced since 
1999, as well as the latest key country profiles, is available through the victim assistance 
portal on the Monitor website.74
COMMUNICATING OBJECTIVES AND REPORTING 
IMPROVEMENTS
According to Action #13 of the Maputo Action Plan, victim objectives should be updated, 
their implementation monitored, and progress reported annually. Each year, “enhancements” 
to plans, policies, legal frameworks, and budgets for the implementation of those plans, 
policies, and legal frameworks should also be reported. More precise reporting is called 
for, and in 2016, a representative of Colombia, a member of the Mine Ban Treaty Victim 
Assistance Committee, noted that states need to listen to needs and show progress, but not 
exaggerate their victim assistance accomplishments.75
As in the previous year, more than half of the most-affected 31 States Parties included 
some information on victim assistance activities in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports 
covering calendar year 2015.76 States Parties that reported on plans, policies, or legislative 
frameworks in Form J of their Article 7 reporting for 2015, primarily addressed existing plans 
with a few references to enhancements or adaptations made to plans or policies. 
However, time-bound and measurable objectives and progress toward goals went almost 
unreported. Only Thailand reported directly on national time-bound and measurable 
objectives. Few States Parties reported on the challenges to implementation of victim 
assistance in their countries as suggested by the 2015 Mine Ban Treaty guide to reporting; 
Sudan and Zimbabwe were notable exceptions where information on challenges was 
noted. States Parties rarely shared good practices in their reports. Key principles of victim 
assistance such as non-discrimination, age and gender sensitivity, accessibility, and inclusion 
were seldom included in the reporting.
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are encouraged to use Form J of the Article 7 reporting 
format “in particular to report on assistance provided for the care and rehabilitation, and 
71 A core principle of the CRPD, the term “on equal basis with others” is used 31 times throughout the CRPD 
text. However, no definition of the term is included.
72 The 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties detailed here, plus Lao PDR and Lebanon that are States Parties to 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
73 Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Findings specific to victim 
assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through Landmine 
Monitor 2016’s companion publication; ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016, the-monitor.org/en-gb/
reports/2016/cluster-munition-monitor-2016/casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx.
74 See, the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/victim-
assistance.aspx
75 Ambassador Beatriz Londoño Soto, Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, “Creating 
understanding and awareness of victim assistance actions in accordance with the Maputo Action Plan at 
all levels,” side event panel, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
76 The States Parties that provided some updates on victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Iraq, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, 
Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. As of 15 October 2016, 12 of the most affected 31 States Parties 
had not submitted Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports for calendar year 2015: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen.
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social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.”77 There is no detailed or specific format 
for reporting on victim assistance under the Mine Ban Treaty, however suggestions and 
guidelines have been presented over time.78
Monitor research has shown that annual updates in reporting are most useful for 
assessment purposes when they clearly indicate when changes occurred against specific key 
indicators or concrete points of progress.
In 2015, a guide for reporting under the Mine Ban Treaty suggested that States Parties 
that are also parties to the CRPD could “draw from efforts that have been undertaken 
in the context of fulfilling CRPD reporting requirements and from the conclusions and 
recommendations made on these reports by the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities.”79 However, due to challenges in CRPD reporting—owing to its 
level of complexity, backlog in reviewing, and relative infrequency—the CRPD has been 
insufficient thus far to replace annual Mine Ban Treaty reporting on progress and challenges 
to addressing the needs of victims.
Regular reporting by States Parties on implementation of the CRPD is required by Article 
35 of that convention. Reporting on the CRPD is less frequent that Mine Ban Treaty reporting. 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities examines each report and provides 
suggestions and recommendations to the State Party. However, despite the adoption of 
a simplified reporting procedure in 2013, in 2015 the committee actually registered an 
increase in the extensive backlog of State Party reports pending review.80
Given the overlap in context and objectives between the CRPD and victim assistance, 
Mine Ban Treaty reporting offers an opportunity for states to specifically address progress 
against recommendations and concerns raised in the CRPD framework. Mine Ban Treaty 
States Parties have not taken that opportunity. Monitor reporting on victim assistance 
does, however, draw specifically from states’ CRPD reporting, alternative reporting, and 
recommendations as they become available. 
In its initial CRPD report submitted in 2015, Algeria made a short reference to landmine 
survivors. Previously, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, and Uganda submitted reports on their 
implementation of the CRPD (Article 35) that had references to landmine victims, mostly 
short notes or references to CRPD Article 11 on humanitarian emergencies and conflict.
FULL AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION
Action #16 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to ensure the “full and active 
participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect 
them.” 
During the reporting period, among the States Parties with victim assistance coordination 
activities during 2015, all had some form of survivor participation or consultation; sometimes 
directly, or through survivors’ representative organizations or DPOs. Nonetheless there 
remains a long way to go for survivors to be effectively included in coordination roles in 
a way that ensures that their input is listened to, understood, and acted upon. In Ethiopia, 
survivors were not directly involved in coordination meetings, but were consulted in the 
development of relevant plans and strategies. In Tajikistan, survivors attended a range of 
relevant meetings.
77 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, Reporting Format.
78 See, ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance (Prepared for the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, 
Socio-economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness), “Draft Suggestion for Use of Form J to Report on 
Victim Assistance,” December 2000, bit.ly/FormJSuggestions2000; and see the more recent Mine Ban 
Treaty, “Guide To Reporting,” October 2015, bit.ly/2MBTReportingGuide2015.
79 Mine Ban Treaty, “Guide to Reporting,” para. G.38, October 2015 (adopted in December 2015 at the 
Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties), bit.ly/2MBTReportingGuide2015.





















Few States Parties endeavored to demonstrate that they are doing their utmost to enhance 
the capacity of survivors for their effective participation, or to specify the methods that they 
are using to build that capacity. Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Thailand reported activities in 
regard to building such capacity.
Mine/ERW survivors also continued to participate actively in Mine Ban Treaty and other 
disarmament and disability rights coordination and campaigning, as well as in matters 
of peacemaking and peace-building in many countries, including in Albania, Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, Senegal, Thailand, and Uganda. 
In the majority of the 31 States Parties, survivors continued to be involved in implementing 
many aspects of victim assistance, including physical rehabilitation, peer support and referral, 
income-generating projects, and needs assessment data collection.81 However, the extent of 
these essential community services was severely reduced due to cuts in the small amounts of 
funding that had previously been available for these activities (see section on funding below).
GENDER AND AGE CONSIDERATIONS
The Maputo Action Plan speaks of “the imperative to address the needs and guarantee the 
rights of mine victims, in an age- and gender-sensitive manner.”82 While men and boys are the 
majority of reported casualties, women and girls may be disproportionally disadvantaged as a 
result of mine/ERW incidents and suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. To guide 
a rights-based approach to victim assistance for women and girls, States Parties can apply the 
principles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).83  Implementation of CEDAW by States Parties to that convention should ensure the 
rights of women and girls and protect them from discrimination and exploitation.84
Some States Parties have begun to address gender issues, often with assistance from 
the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP). GMAP assessments of national mine 
action programs always include victim assistance as a component. Since 2013, GMAP has 
assessed the following Mine Ban Treaty States Parties’ programs: Afghanistan, DRC, Mali, 
Mozambique,  Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Darfur), and Tajikistan. The DRC assessment 
was carried out in 2015.85 The national victim assistance working group in Serbia also 
proposed the integration of victim assistance for women into the National Action Plan for 
UN Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.
Age considerations
Child survivors have specific and additional needs in all aspects of assistance. During the 
reporting period, some progress in addressing the specific needs of child survivors was 
reported in some domains of assistance, particularly psychosocial support and education. 
In this regard, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is particularly relevant to the 
implementation of victim assistance with a rights-based approach. The annually updated 
Monitor fact sheet on the Impact of Mines/ERW on Children contains more details on issues 
pertaining to children, youth, and adolescents.86 
81 Participation in service and program implementation was reported in at least the following 25 States 
Parties: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El 
Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, 
Uganda, and Yemen.
82 Maputo Action Plan Action #17.
83 Of the 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, all except Somalia and Sudan are also States Parties to 
CEDAW.
84 The Committee of CEDAW General Recommendation 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and 
post-conflict situations, and General Recommendation 27 on older women and protection of their human 
rights are also particularly applicable.
85 As well as Mine Ban Treaty states not party Lao PDR and Vietnam. Email from Calza Bini Arianna, GMAP, 
12 October 2016.
86 These fact sheets can be accessed at the Monitor, “Victim Assistance Resources,” the-monitor.org/en-gb/
our-research/victim-assistance.aspx.
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SPECIAL ISSUES OF CONCERN: FRAGILE STATES, 
CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES
States Parties facing conflict and deteriorating security situations often report interruption 
of victim assistance activities and services, and a lack of accessibility to existing services.87 
At least 15 (about half) of the Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with significant numbers 
of landmine victims88 are listed in the 2015 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report, “States of Fragility.” States with fragile situations may require 
more capacity or support in order to compile and submit updates on victim assistance. 
Further to the difficulties faced in fragile states, conflict situations and natural disasters also 
influence the prevalence of disability, both by creating impairments and by creating barriers 
to access in the physical environment.89 
Several activities were underway to raise awareness of, or improve, responses to the 
needs and rights of persons with disabilities in armed conflicts and fragile situations that 
could potentially benefit mine survivors and their communities.
A special session of the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016 on Inclusion 
of Persons with Disabilities into Humanitarian Action resulted in the adoption of a charter 
that is open for endorsement by states and NGOs alike.90 The session, chaired by the Special 
Rapporteur on Disabilities, saw relevant interventions by UNMAS, Handicap International, 
and several others. No mine/ERW survivors were reported to have participated in the session.
A 2015 thematic study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) notes that under the Maputo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty States 
Parties committed to integrate landmine victims with disabilities into the broader legal 
frameworks related to the rights of persons with disabilities, thus reflecting “a more updated 
understanding of the issue.”91 The issues related to the rights of persons with disabilities in 
situations of conflict and humanitarian emergencies were further discussed and considered 
by the Human Rights Council in March 2016.92
Overall, these states likely face challenging barriers to fulfilling their commitments under 
the Maputo Action Plan and to reporting progress and gaps in assistance. With specific 
international support and well-directed cooperation, as well as increased national focus at 
all levels of governance, States Parties in fragile situations would be better able to address 
victim assistance commitments.93
COOPERATION, SUPPORT, AND FUNDING FOR VICTIM 
ASSISTANCE
Action #20 of the Maputo Action Plan calls on States Parties to “effectively use all possible 
avenues to support States Parties seeking to receive assistance.” Concerning victim 
assistance, this includes “providing targeted assistance and supporting broader efforts to 
87 See, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Victim assistance and CRPD Article 11: Situations of risk 
and humanitarian emergencies,” 25 June 2015, staging.monitor.lastexitlondon.com/media/2034853/
MonitorBriefingPaper_VAandArticle11_25June2015.pdf.
88 Afghanistan, BiH, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. 
89 World Health Organization and World Bank, World report on disability, Geneva, 2011, p. 37, www.who.int/
disabilities/world_report/2011/en.
90 “Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action,” humanitariandisabilitycharter.
org.
91 OHCHR, “Thematic study on the rights of persons with disabilities under article 11 of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, on situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies,” A/HRC/31/30, 
para. 19, 30 November 2015.
92 Human Rights Council, “The rights of persons with disabilities in situations of risk and humanitarian 
emergencies,” A/HRC/31/L.8, 21 March 2016.




















enhance frameworks.” In 2016, Australia summarized this twin-track approach—also referred 
to as an integrated approach—to victim assistance with regard to donors across conventions 
as follows: 
…development assistance needs to include specific programs for survivors, which 
are also accessible to other people with disabilities. Our development assistance 
also needs to include programs to ensure the needs of survivors as well as all other 
people with disabilities are addressed in national level policies and programs.94
Even with the efforts of states to find pathways for suitable sustainable resource 
allocation, in 2015 inadequate funding and resources in many states contributed to a 
reduction in activities to deliver most direct assistance and services to survivors, including 
those of international organizations, national and international NGOs, and DPOs. Thus, in 
May 2016, the ICBL expressed concern that in many countries local-level resources available 
for victim assistance are “reaching the point of catastrophic deficiency.” At the same time the 
UN stated that “victim assistance is a mine action pillar that remains grossly underfunded.”95
Cases from States Parties with significant numbers of survivors that experienced severe 
funding shortages for victim assistance, thus disrupting the implementation of activities or 
otherwise impeding progress in improving the quality of life of survivors in 2015–2016, can 
be seen in the following examples:
  In Angola, the economic crisis due to reduced oil prices slashed funds available 
for government-supported assistance and resulted in a near shutdown of most 
victim assistance programs. The government refurbished some rehabilitation and 
orthopedic clinics, but failed to provide the supplies and materials needed to deliver 
services.  
  In BiH, a lack of resources continued to erode victim assistance efforts by NGOs as 
donor funding declined. After more than 18 years of continuous operation, the NGO 
Landmine Survivors Initiatives (once a branch office of the United States-based NGO 
Landmine Survivors Network/Survivor Corps) closed down permanently.96
  In Burundi, there was a reduction in the number of victim assistance service providers 
due to lack of funding in 2015.97 Implementation of the National Victim Assistance 
Action Plan remained largely on hold due to deficient resources.98
  In Chad, the timeframe of the National Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2012–2014 
had been extended to 2017 because of a lack of resources for its implementation. 
However, in 2015, further budget cuts did not allow for implementation of the plan. 
  In DRC, international funding for victim assistance provided through UNMAS 
and other donors remained worryingly low in 2015.99 This led to a stagnation in 
94 Statement of Australia, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016, www.
apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-may16/statements/eng/2_VA_COMMITTEE_-_
Australia.pdf
95 Statement of the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional 
Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016.
96 Landmine Survivors Initiatives, “The closure of Association ‘Landmine Survivors Initiatives’,” 31 May 2016, 
www.ipm-lsi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=238%3Asaoptenje-o-zatvaranju-
udruenja-inicijative-preivjelih-od-mina&catid=36%3Anovosti&Itemid=76&lang=en; and see also, Amir 
Mujanovic, “Providing Integrated Peer-support Assistance to Landmine Survivors,” The Journal of ERW and 
Mine Action, Issue 19.3, December 2015, www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/19.3/feature/mujanovic.shtml.
97 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eric Niragira, Training Centre for Development of Ex-Combatants 
(CEDAC), 6 October 2015.
98 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Méthode Niyungeko, DAHMI, 1 August 2016.
99 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Francky Miantuala, President, National Committee of Organizations 
for Persons with Disabilities and on Mine Victim Assistance (Collectif National des Organisations des 
Personnes Handicapées et d’Assistance aux Victimes de Mines, CNOPHAVM), Kinshasa, 11 April 2016; 
by Baudouin Asubeti Milongo, Centre Congolais de la Lutte Antimines (CCLAM), 11 July 2016; and by 
Valentin Tshitenge, Head of Medico-Social Care for Persons with Disabilities at the National Programme 
for Community-Based Rehabilitation (Programme National de Réhabilitation à Base Communautaire, 
PNRBC), Kinshasa, 18 July 2016.
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the availability of services, the number of actors, and geographical coverage of 
assistance.100
  In Croatia, there was an overall decrease in the number of people that could get 
assistance due to the “omnipresent lack of financial resources.”101 The government 
reduced overall funding for programs for persons with disabilities as part of budget 
cuts.102 Austerity measures had already reduced the previously achieved standard 
supply of orthopedic devices.103
  In Ethiopia, a major rehabilitation provider reported a significant decrease in 
victim assistance services and limited the range of mobile outreach teams due to a 
reduction of funds.104
  Iraq suffers from a financial crisis, while the focus of donors and international NGOs 
is on the massive needs of internally displaced persons. This has diverted financial 
support away from victim assistance and minimized the scale of service provision to 
mine/ERW survivors across the country.105
  In Mozambique, insufficient financial resources was one of the main challenges to 
implementation of victim assistance activities.106 Donors were reported to be losing 
interest in victim assistance as a result of the completion of landmine clearance in 
the country.107
  In Tajikistan, the main obstacle to the implementation of victim assistance- and 
disability-related projects and programs was the lack of sustainable funding from 
both the government and donors.108
  In Uganda, a significant reduction in the overall level of survivor participation in 
2015 was attributed to a lack of funding for victim assistance programs in general.109
Similarly, a lack of funding was reported to have reduced services in Afghanistan, El 
Salvador, and Yemen—States Parties also experiencing conflict or security concerns. In 
Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, resources as well as the impact of conflict were also 
impediments to the provision of assistance.
Analysis of victim assistance funding in detailed data available since 2007 shows a decline 
in total funding over time. The number of donor-reported contributions110 made annually 
also decreased in real terms and as compared to the total annual earmarked funding. Of 
the total annual funding earmarked for victim assistance, generally some US$10–13 million 
per year was allocated to the ICRC and $2–5 million to Handicap International; these 
figures remained fairly constant. Funding to a diversity of other organizations and projects, 
particularly to survivors’ representative organizations, decreased significantly. 
100 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Francky Miantuala, CNOPHAVM, Kinshasa, 11 April 2016; and by 
Valentin Tshitenge, PNRBC, 18 July 2016.
101 Statement of Croatia, CCW Protocol V Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 7 April 2015.
102 US Department of State, “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Croatia,” Washington, DC, 13 
April 2016, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252833.
103 Ombudsman of the Republic of Croatia, “Universal Periodic Review On Human Rights In The Republic Of 
Croatia - Nhri Report, 2nd cycle,” September 2014.
104 Email from Fasil Ayele, CSE, Addis Ababa, 13 April 2016.
105 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Ahmed Al Zubaidi, Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization 
(IHSCO), 27 July 2016.
106 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2015), Form H.
107 Notes from side event, “Lessons learnt from a ‘Mine-Free’ Mozambique: Article 5 Compliance,” hosted 
by the Permanent Mission of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, 2 
December 2015.
108 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Reykhan Muminova, Disability Support Unit Advisor, TMAC, 24 
August 2016.
109 Response to Monitor questionnaire from Margaret Arach Orech, Director, Uganda Landmine Survivors 
Association, 12 July 2015.
110 Each such contribution to an implementing organization, intermediary organization, or project is reported 
separately by donor countries for funding that includes grants, project and organization support, or other 




















International donor funding for victim assistance 2007–2015
Despite an earlier “prediction that in the coming years we will see a downward trend in 
funds identified as dedicated to assisting victims…but that more and more states, including 
donors…will strive to ensure that their development cooperation is inclusive of all persons 
with disabilities,”111 to date funding through other frameworks such as disability-inclusive 
development has not been demonstrated to have replaced victim assistance-earmarked 
funding nor general funding shortages.
There may be a general misconception that victim assistance-earmarked funding 
necessarily assists only or even mostly mine/ERW victims. Rather, victim assistance 
contributions are directed at projects and sectors that include mine victims amongst 
beneficiaries and are most often labelled as such because they are among those financial 
contributions designated through or authorized by the government aid humanitarian 
agencies that also allocate mine action funding. Consequently, earmarked victim assistance 
funding is equally important to survivors and indirect victims as well as other persons 
with similar needs. The ICBL-CMC has recommended that donors support targeted victim 
assistance where needed and effective, and fund the implementation of national victim 
assistance plans, as well as disability action plans and other plans and policies, that have 
been shown to positively impact victims. Donors can thus dedicate victim assistance funding 
to fill gaps in service delivery that are needed by mine/ERW victims and ensure access to 
existing services available to a broader population.112
Thailand and Belgium, as co-chairs of the Victim Assistance Standing Committee in 2009—
as they were again on the Victim Assistance Committee in 2015—presented a set of guidance 
recommendations for implementation of victim assistance. What they recommended then, 
regarding resource mobilization, remains as true today: Addressing the rights and needs of 
mine victims…
…requires sustained political, financial and material commitments, provided 
both through national commitments and international, regional and bilateral 
cooperation and assistance, in accordance with the obligations under Article 6.3. 
No progress in improving the quality of daily life of mine victims and other persons 
with disabilities will be possible without adequate resources to implement 
policies and programmes.113
111 Presentation of Norway, “Convention on Cluster Munitions Technical Workshop on Cooperation and 
Assistance,” 15 April 2013, www.clusterconvention.org/files/2013/04/II-Norway.pdf.
112 ICBL-CMC, “Frameworks for Victim Assistance: Recommendations for States,” Geneva, 3 December 2013.
113 “Assisting the Victims: Recommendations on Implementing the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014,” 
presented to the Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference by Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee 





































2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Number of reported contributionsAnnual total US$ millions
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In October 2016, ICBL Ambassador, Landmine Monitor researcher, and landmine survivor 
Margaret Arach Orech described the dire situation regarding support for victim assistance 
and the need to resolve it through close consultation with survivors, which is consistent with 
these Monitor findings. Drawing from her own experience and that of other survivors, she 
said in a presentation: 
Spending on victim assistance has consistently declined in the recent past. 
Despite the good policies, legal environment and the accompanying strategies for 
disability issues…the amount of public resources directly allocated for disability 
programs or for making mainstream programs, whether schools or work places, 
accessible, is insufficient.  
There is considerable discrepancy between what is promised through 
government policies and what is provided for in the budgets. Generally, limited or 
lack of funds targeted to specific issues related to persons with disabilities further 
contribute to the discrimination and marginalization of persons with disabilities, 
as policies and programs geared towards promoting equal opportunities for 
vulnerable populations including persons with disabilities are meagerly funded.
Listening and taking into account survivors’ voices is imperative for effective 
planning of programs or activities that benefit them…Continue to make victim 
assistance earmarked funds available, and step up efforts to ensure that broader, 
mainstream policies and programs also respond to the reality faced by survivors 
and other persons with disabilities. 114
IN MEMORIAM
On 13 September 2016, a landmine survivor 
known to friends as Pa (Aunty) Tang passed away. 
Pa Tang (Taeng Changade) carried on the spirit 
of the grassroots movement behind the Mine 
Ban Treaty. Even in hard times she participated 
in saying what the situation was on the ground, 
giving her time and energy, and while she 
physically could, coming to meet campaigners, 
researchers, and others to give her view and add 
to the fight against mines and for victims’ rights.
Pa Tang lived in the Sa Kaeo Province of 
Thailand, at the border with Cambodia. She lost 
her leg to a landmine while collecting tamarinds 
to sell at market circa 2003. Her husband left 
because of her impairment and disability. She lived by herself and supported herself in the 
years afterwards, until one day she had a terrible accident, lost her balance, and fell into 
the cooking fire at her home. With severe burns she moved to live with her sister and her 
children. The family struggled to meet its basic needs. During her last years in her sixties, 
Pa Tang received some support such as rice and small home adjustments from community-
based organizations, with help from the local survivor leader and campaigner. 
Pa Tang’s passing reminds us that the promise of victim assistance obligations must be 
realized within the lifetime of survivors. Survivors are active participants and not statistics.
114 Margaret Arach Orech, Uganda Landmine Survivors Association (ICBL Ambassador and Landmine Monitor 
researcher for Uganda), “Faster Progress and Higher Standards from Working with Affected Communities 
and Victims,” Humanitarian Disarmament Forum, New York, 16 October 2016.
Pa Tang 
















































































Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the March 2016 pledging conference for the Mine 
Ban Treaty. Annan is also pictured in the banner at the signing ceremony for the treaty in 1997.















SUPPORT FOR  
MINE ACTION
Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the 
right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order 
to fulfill its treaty obligations. This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action 
provided for calendar year 2015 by affected countries and international donors. Cooperation 
and assistance, however, is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance 
can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel as well as the exchange of 
experience, know-how, and best-practice sharing. 
2015 FIGURES AND TRENDS
  Total contributions (international and national): Thirty-five donors and 14 affected 
states contributed US$471.3 million in international and national support for mine 
action in 20151; this is $139 million less than in 2014 (a 23% decrease). 
  International contributions accounted for 72% of overall support for mine action 
in 2015, while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs 
accounted for the remaining 28% of global funding. 
  Donors contributed $340.1 million in international support for mine action to 41 
affected states and three other areas. This represents a decrease of nearly $77 
million from 2014 (an 18% decrease). 
  National contributions: The Monitor identified 14 affected states that provided 
$131.2 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, $62.4 
million less than in 2014 (a 32% decrease), when 13 affected countries reported 
contributing $193.6 million.
  Contributions from the top five donors—the United States (US), Japan, the European 
Union (EU), Norway, and the Netherlands—amounted to more than $240 million and 
accounted for 71% of all international funding.
1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs 
for calendar year 2015, as of October 2016. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed 
in current dollars. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines, cluster munitions, and 
unexploded ordnance, but is rarely disaggregated. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level 
of detail and some utilize a fiscal year other than the calendar year. 
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  The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Syria—
received a combined total of $162 million, representing 48% of all international 
contributions. 
  International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance 
and risk education (64% of all funding), victim assistance (7%), capacity-building 
(1%), advocacy (0.5%), and stockpile destruction (0.5%). The remaining 27% was not 
disaggregated by the donors.
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2015
In 2015, 35 donors contributed $340.1 million in international support for mine action in 
41 affected states and three other areas (down from 42 states and three areas in 2014), a 
decline of $76.7 million from the $416.8 million reported in 2014.2
This is the third year running that donors decreased their international mine action 
assistance, and the first time since 2005 that international support dropped below $400 
million. In 2015, international support fell more sharply (18% decrease) than in 2014 (5% 
decrease) or 2013 (12% decrease). 
International support for mine action: 2005–2015
In 2016, donors hosted three international pledging conferences during which they 
committed resources to support mine action activities as well as the treaty’s implementation 
support unit:
  In March, Chile hosted in Geneva the first International Pledging Conference for 
the Implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, which aimed 
at renewing and strengthening donors’ commitment to mine action. Sixty-nine 
delegations participated in the pledging conference, including 52 States Parties, two 
states not party, and 15 other organizations. In total, 20 States Parties made pledges 
to the treaty implementation support unit, and three States Parties added details 
regarding their future commitments for support to mine action;
  In July, Canada, Germany, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and the US co-hosted in 
Washington, DC a Pledging Conference in support of Iraq. Funding for demining 
was one of four issues addressed during the conference, with eight donors pledging 
financial and technical support;
2 Data for 2015 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 
reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
Amended Protocol II Annual Reports, ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2015, UNMAS Annual 
Report 2015, and answers from donors to questionnaires. Thirteen of the 27 States Parties documented in 
this chapter reported international funding for mine action in a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2015, 
compared to 15 out of 26 States Parties in 2014. 
0
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  In September, Norway and the US co-hosted in New York City a Global Demining 
Initiative for Colombia ministerial-level meeting in order to secure commitments 
from donors to support demining activities in Colombia. Nineteen donor countries 
and the EU participated in the meeting with 15 donors pledging financial and 
technical support. 
At present it is not possible to determine how these conferences will impact overall 
support for mine action in 2016. 
DONORS IN 2015
In 2015, 27 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, two states not party, the EU, and five international 
institutions3 contributed a total of $340.1 million to mine action. 




2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
US 119.2 118.1 113.9 134.4 131.4 617.0
Japan 49.3 49.1 64.0 57.6 43.0 263.0
EU 29.0 66.8 39.6 60.7 19.3 215.4
Norway 22.3 41.8 49.6 48.4 53.4 215.5
Netherlands 22.1 25.9 23.4 24.1 21.3 116.8
Switzerland 17.4 18.1 20.6 18.4 17.5 92.0
UK 15.4 13.1 22.8 22.0 18.0 91.3
Germany 15.2 17.5 22.1 23.8 23.6 102.2
Denmark 9.2 12.1 9.3 8.7 9.3 48.6
Canada 8.9 7.7 7.9 6.8 17.1 48.4
Sweden 6.1 7.8 12.9 14.1 12.2 53.1
Finland 5.5 8.0 7.7 7.2 7.4 35.8
Australia 4.1 6.6 14.5 24.0 45.7 94.9
Ireland 3.6 4.5 4.1 3.6 4.0 19.8
New Zealand 3.2 7.5 6.7 5.4 4.3 27.1
Italy 3.0 2.2 1.5 2.8 3.4 12.9
Luxembourg 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.2 2.2 8.4
France 1.1 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.3 7.8
Other donors* 3.9 7.2 16.3 33.7 31.9 93.0
Total 340.1 416.8 440.9 498.9 466.3 2163.0
* Other donors in 2015 included: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), 
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the OPEC Fund for International 
Development, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP).
 
3 The CEB, the UNOCHA, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the OSCE, and the UNDP. 
4 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of 
international support for 2013 was revised to include a contribution from the EU to the Philippines that 
was not previously reported by the Monitor. Totals for 2012 and 2011 have also been rectified as a result 
of database clean-up. 
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The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors contributing 
a total of $241.9 million, or more than 70% of all international funding for 2015. The US 
remained the largest mine action donor and alone provided more than one-third of all 
international mine action support in 2015. Japan ranked second with nearly 15% of all 
contributions, while the next three donors—the EU, Norway, and the Netherlands—provided 
more than $20 million each. Canada re-entered the top 10, replacing Finland, which reduced 
its contributions by a total of $2.4 million. Sixteen donors contributed less than $1 million 
each, compared to 13 in 2014.
Support from States Parties in 2015 accounted for more than half of all donor funding, 
with 27 countries providing some $190 million. While this represents a decline from the 
$230 million recorded in 2014, States Parties’ total contributions to mine action in 2015 
was proportionally similar to all support in 2014. The top five State Party contributors—
Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK—provided $126.5million (37% of 
all support).
In 2015, the EU and its member states5 contributed a total of $113.5 million and accounted 
for 33% of total international support reported, down from $166 million provided in 2014 
(40% of total international funding for that year). 
International funding for mine action in 2015 decreased by $76.7 million compared 
with 2014. Thirteen donors decreased their funding, led by the EU ($37.8 million down) and 
Norway ($19.5 million down), who together accounted for $57 million of the global decline. 
Two donors from 2014 did not report any contribution to mine action in 2015: Saudi Arabia 
and the Common Humanitarian Fund. 
In contrast, four donors contributed more in 2015 than they did in 2014; including a $2.3 
million increase from the UK. Canada and the US increased their assistance by more than $1 
million each. Four new donors—one State Party, and three institutions—were also identified 
in2015: Poland, the CEB, the UNOCHA, and the UNDP. 
Summary of major changes in 2015
Change Donors Combined Total
Decrease of more than 
$10 million
The EU and Norway $57.3 million decrease
Decrease of less than 
$10 million
Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland 
$25.5 million decrease
Increase of more than 
$1 million
Canada, the UK, and the US $4.6 million increase
Increase of less than 
$1 million
Italy $0.7 million increase
Donors from 2014 
that discontinued their 
support in 2015
The Common Humanitarian Fund, and 
Saudi Arabia
$0.7 million provided in 
2014
New donors in 2015 Poland, CEB, UNOCHA, and the UNDP $1.5  million provided 
in 2015
As detailed in the table below, changes in the exchange rates between national currencies 
and the US dollar negatively affected the US dollar value of international contributions. 
5 Eighteen EU member states provided funding in 2015: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, 















For instance, when expressed in US dollar terms, mine action international support fell in 
a dozen countries and the EU, with the biggest decreases recorded in Belgium (-91%), Spain 
(-61%), the EU (-57%), and Norway (-47%). Whereas in national currency terms, declines were 
recorded in nine countries and the EU, and were less pronounced, although they remain 
significant in most instances. Similarly, whereas seven states reported increases in their 
mine action contributions in 2015, after conversion into US dollars, increases were smaller 
percentage-wise and only observed for four of them: Canada, Italy, Japan, and the UK. 



















Australia -A$1,872,288 -26% -2,515,983 -38%
Belgium -€2,108,028 -89% -2,862,472 -91%
Canada +C$2,985,063 +35% +1,286,435 +17%
Denmark -DKK5,992,070 -9% -2,893,585 -24%
EU -€24,176,117 -48% -37,889,611 -57%
Finland -€1,000,000 -17% -2,430,200 -30%
Germany +€522,724 +4% -2,321,657 -13%
Ireland -€120,132 -4% -881,638 -20%
Italy +€1,011,863 +61% 757,397 +34%
Japan -¥775,709,694 +15% +203,544 0%
Netherlands +€417,089 +2% -3,820,985 -15%
New Zealand -NZ$4,411,378 -49% -4,270,699 -57%
Norway - NOK83,259,000 -31% -19,497,908 -47%
Spain -€442,626 -53% -673,298 -61%
Sweden -SEK1,515,000 -3% -1,629,144 -21%
Switzerland +CHF213,670 +1% -680,752 -4%
UK +£2,079,294 +26% +2,221,763 +17%
FUNDING PATHS
Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by UNMAS and the ITF 
Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known 
as the International Trust Fund).
In 2015, contributions to the VTF totaled $52.6 million from 19 donors, compared to 
some $45 million from 22 donors in 2014.7 Several small donors used the VTF to contribute 
6 Average exchange rates for 2015: A$1=US$0.7522; C$1.2791=US$1; DKK6.7263=US$1; €1=US$1.1096; 
¥121.05=US$1; NZ$0.7001=US$1; NOK8.0681=US$1; £1=US$1.5284; SEK8.4350=US$1; and 
CHF0.9628=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2016, www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/G5a/current/default.htm.
7 UNMAS, Annual Report 2015, September 2015, pp. 22–23, www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/
publications/2016 UNMAS Annual Report.pdf. 
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to mine action.8 Twelve donors and two international institutions allocated $7 million in 
2015 through the ITF for mine action programs in seven states and one area, as well as for 
global activities.9
Other organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2015 
included Norwegian People’s Aid ($24.8 million), Halo Trust ($20.8 million), the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) ($11.5 million from nine donors), and the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($10.8 million from seven donors). 
RECIPIENTS
A total of 41 states and three other areas received $302.7 million from 31 donors in 2015. A 
further $37.4 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, 
NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.10
Afghanistan received the largest amount of funding ($52.6 million) from the largest 
number of donors (17). Nine states, or one-fifth of all recipients, had only one donor.11









Afghanistan 52.6 Sri Lanka 5.6
Global 37.4 Zimbabwe 3.2
Iraq 36.6 Mozambique 3.1
Lao PDR 29.7 Tajikistan 3.0
Cambodia 28.2 Palestine 2.9
Syria 14.8 Sudan 2.7
Colombia 14.6 Yemen 2.0
Ukraine 11.3 Palau 1.9
Somalia 10.0 Croatia 1.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) 9.6 Somaliland 1.8
South Sudan 8.7 Serbia 1.6
Lebanon 8.7 Albania 1.6
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
8.1 Philippines 1.5
Myanmar 7.8 Western Sahara 1.2
Vietnam 7.1 Georgia 1.2
Libya 6.8 Mali 1.0
Angola 6.7 Other recipients* 5.3
Total 340.1
Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics.
* Other recipients in 2015 included: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Egypt, India, Jordan, 
Kosovo, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Peru, Solomon Islands, and Thailand. Each received less than $1 
8 The small donors included Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, and South Korea.
9 ITF Enhancing Human Security, Annual Report 2015, April 2016, pp. 21–22, www.itf-fund.si/public/
upload/brosure/itf_ar_2015.pdf. 
10 Four donors provided funding to global activities only: Andorra, Austria, Estonia, and the OSCE.
















As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The 
top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, and Syria—received 48% of 
all international support in 2015. 
In 2015, 33 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared 
to 2014, including 11 recipients receiving less support and four recipients receiving no new 
support. Syria12 was the recipient with the largest increase, receiving $13.4 million more 
than in 2014, while Angola13 was the recipient with the largest decrease, receiving $25.9 
million less than in 2014. These fluctuations may be a reflection of shifts in donor priorities 
and changes in local situations, as well as the closing of some programs. 
REGIONAL SUPPORT IN 2015
The East and South Asia and the Pacific region received the highest share of international 
support at 40%; followed by the Middle East and North Africa (22%), Sub-Saharan Africa 
(14%), Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (9%), and the Americas (4%).
While support to the first two regions remained relatively unchanged in 2015, the share 
of support going to Sub-Saharan Africa declined by more than 40% compared to 2014 as a 
result of substantial drops in support provided to Angola (-80%) and to Mozambique (-70%), 
which declared itself to be mine-free in 2015. 
The proportion of funding going to Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia also decreased 
by 40% in 2015, which is the result of a return to a normal level of funding following a 
significant disbursement of EU funds to Turkey for clearance activities in 2014. 











East and South Asia and the Pacific 136.6 149.8 -9%
Middle East and North Africa 74.0 69.5 +6%
Sub-Saharan Africa 46.4 78.3 -41%
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia 31.0 51.5 -40%
Americas 14.7 11.6 +27%
Global 37.4 56.0 -33%
Total 340.1 416.8
FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR
In 2015, 64% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities. 
Victim assistance support dropped by $4 million from 2014, but still represented 7% of total 
international support to mine action. Stockpile destruction received less than $1 million, 
12 Despite a dramatic increase in funding received, conflict and instability prevented access to areas 
requiring clearance and the implementation of a comprehensive mine action program in Syria. Some 
of the funding received in 2015 was used by international humanitarian demining organizations for 
clearance, risk education, and victim assistance in Syria. Projects also sought to improve the capabilities 
of local Syrian organizations, often supported by offices outside the country. See, for example, UNMAS, 
“Programmes: Syria,” last updated September 2016.
13 The sharp decrease in international support for mine action in Angola in 2015 is the result of changes in 
donors’ contributions, notably following the one-year disbursement of EU funds for clearance activities in 
Angola in 2014 (with $25 million received). 
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donated by Germany for the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM-1 landmines through the NATO 
Support Agency. 
Various funding represented 27% of all international support to mine action. This includes 
contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any 
sectors. Unearmarked funding represented more than 10% ($11.9 million) of all various 
funding in 2015. 





% of total 
contribution No. of donors
Clearance and risk education 218.6 64% 23
Various 90.2 27% 25
Victim assistance 24.2 7% 17
Capacity building 4.4 1% 8
Advocacy 2.2 0.5% 8
Stockpile destruction 0.5 0.5% 1
Total 340.1 100% N/A
Note: N/A = not applicable
Clearance and risk education
In 2015, $218.6 million, or 64% of all reported support for 
mine action, went toward clearance and risk education 
activities. This represents a decrease of $63.2 million 
from 2014.
Five of the 10 largest donors—the US, Japan, the 
EU, Norway, and the UK—provided three-quarters of all 
support to clearance and risk education ($167.1 million). 
Many donors reported clearance and risk education 
as a combined figure. Twenty-three donors did, however, 
indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, 
providing a total of $106 million in 33 countries and 
other areas (21 States Parties, one Signatory, eight states 
not party, and three other areas). 
Twelve donors reported contributions totaling $6.1 
million specifically for risk education projects in 10 
countries. Iraq received the most risk education-specific funding with $1.5 million. 
Victim assistance15
Direct international support for victim assistance activities reached $24.2 million in 2015, 
down from $27.7 million in 2014. This represents 7% of all reported support for mine action 
in 2015, about the same share as in 2014 and 2013. 
14 In 2014, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education 
($281.8 million, or 68% of total international support), victim assistance ($27.7 million, or 7%), advocacy 
($20.7million, or 5%), capacity-building ($14.9 million, or 3%), stockpile destruction ($3.2 million, or 1%), 
and various activities ($68.5 million, or 16%).
15 Funding for victim assistance activities is especially difficult to track because many donors report that 
they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of 
persons with disabilities. In some cases, the Monitor does not include those funds in its reporting. In cases 
where it is included, it is difficult to estimate to what extent resources effectively reach landmine victims.
Delegates to the March 2016 pledging conference 
for the Mine Ban Treaty.
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Seventeen16 of the 35 donors identified reported contributing to victim assistance projects 
in 10 States Parties, five states not party, and one other area.17 Most mine-affected countries 
did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. 
The top three victim assistance donors—the US, Germany, and Switzerland—provided 
63% ($15.2 million) of all victim assistance funding in 2015. 
Eight donors reported contributing $11.9 million, half of all support to victim assistance 
in 2015, through the ICRC or national Red Cross societies. 
Advocacy & capacity-building
In 2015, less than 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities 
($2.2 million), this represented a drop of more than $20 million compared to 2014. Of the 
35 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, eight reported supporting 
advocacy activities.
Eight donors provided $4.4 million—1% of all international support—to support capacity-
building activities in five States Parties, two states not party, and one other area. 
NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2015
While there has been more transparency from affected states, overall national contributions 
to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in 
their annual Article 7 reports.18 States Parties such as Algeria and Iraq, as well as states not 
party India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination 
and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported annual 
expenditures. 
Fourteen affected states reported $131.2 million in contributions to mine action from 
their national budget in 2015, some $62 million less than the $193.6 million reported in 
2014 (a 32% decrease).19 This decrease is largely the result of less support provided by Angola 
to its mine action program, with a total contribution amounting to $60 million in 2015 (half 
as much as in 2014, when it provided more than $120 million). Nevertheless, Angola still 
accounted for 43% of all national funding for 2015. Additionally, four States Parties reported 
contributing a large part of their own mine action programs: Bosnia and Herzegovina ($13.2 
million, 58% of total program cost), Chile ($4.4 million, 100%), Croatia ($30.8 million, 56%), 
and Peru ($1.4 million, 88%); as did state not party Lebanon ($9.0 million, 52%). 
FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION  
2011–2015
Over the past five years (2011–2015), total support to mine action amounted to $3.1 billion, 
an average of about $614 million per year. 20
16 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Belgium, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Slovenia, Turkey, the US, and the OPEC Fund for 
International Development.
17 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia, South 
Sudan, and Ukraine. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: 
Egypt, India, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Palestine. Western Sahara was the sole other area that received 
victim assistance funding. 
18 Only two of the 14 affected states analyzed in this chapter reported national funding for mine action in 
a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2015: Sudan and Zimbabwe. For 2014, only Sudan reported. 
19 Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
20 The last time total support amounted to less than $500 million was in 2005, when it was $418.9 million, 
according to revised Monitor data.
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Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support has accounted 
for about 30% of total mine action funding over the period, and amounted to approximately 
$905 million. 
International support totaled $2.2 billion, an average of $430 million per year, and 
represented 70% of all support. Three donors—the US, Japan, and Norway—contributed 
$1.1 billion, almost 50% of total international support. Three other donors—the EU, the 
Netherlands, and Germany—contributed more than $100 million each. Support from States 
Parties accounted for 60% of all international funding with $1.3 billion provided.
Between 2011–2015, the top four recipients—Afghanistan ($360.8 million), Iraq ($174.5 
million), Lao PDR ($164.7 million), and Cambodia ($149.7 million)—received 40% of all 
international contributions. 
Summary of contributions: 2011–2015
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The Broken Chair outside the UN in Geneva is equipped with a prosthetic for the International 
Day of Persons with Disabilities. Daniel Berset’s artistic work was first installed in 1997 by 
Handicap International to encourage signature and entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty.















STATUS OF THE 
CONVENTION
1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-
PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (1997 
MINE BAN TREATY)
Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into 
force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second 
date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign 
rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as 
accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has 
not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s). 
As of 10 November 2016 there were 162 States Parties.  
STATES PARTIES
Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a) 
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00 
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01 
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02 
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99 
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99 
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99 
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98 
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00 
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99 
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a) 
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98 
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98 
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a) 
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98 
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00 
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99 
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06 
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98 
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98 
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03 
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99 
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02 
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
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Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01 
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a) 
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99 
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01 
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00 
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a) 
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99 
Côte d’Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98 
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03 
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99 
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98 
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98 
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99 
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a) 
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a) 
Estonia 12 May 04 (a) 
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) 
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02 
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00 
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03 
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98 
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99 
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98 
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01 
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03 
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06 
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98 
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98 
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99 
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99 
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98 
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98 
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98 
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01 
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a) 
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98 
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a) 
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99 
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03 
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99 
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a) 
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99 
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98 
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99 
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00 
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98 
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01 
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00 
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97 
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98 
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00 
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98 
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98 
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98 
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a) 
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99 
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99 
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99 
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a) 
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98 
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98 
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98 
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a) 
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98 
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98 
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99 
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98 
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00 
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00 















Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 
1 Aug 01 
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98 
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98 
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03 
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98 
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a) 
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00 
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01 
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98 
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a) 
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98 
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99 
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03 
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02 
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98 
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98 
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98 
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a) 
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00 
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98 
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a) 
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00 
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98 
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99 
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a) 
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98 
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99 
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98 
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01 
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99 
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98 
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01 
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
SIGNATORY







































CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, 
STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF  
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION
PREAMBLE
The States Parties
Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel 
mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless 
civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, 
inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe 
consequences for years after emplacement,
Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated 
manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the 
world, and to assure their destruction, 
Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, 
including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,
Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important 
confidence-building measure,
Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, 
Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the 
early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,
Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 
1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international 
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, 
Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and 
multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production 
and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced 
by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end 
undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around 
the world, 
Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 
June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally 
binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines, 
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, 
and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all 
relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, 
regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 















Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of 
the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on 
the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and 
materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and 
combatants, 
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
General obligations
1.  Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or 
indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to 
a State Party under this Convention.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
1.  “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity 
or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines 
designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to 
a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel 
mines as a result of being so equipped.
2.  “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other 
surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a 
vehicle.
3.  “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, 
linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is 
made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine. 
4.  “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into 
or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not 
involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.




1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a 
number of anti- personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, 
mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall 
not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
88 
ARTICLE 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its 
jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into 
force of this Convention for that State Party.
ARTICLE 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 
ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or 
control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall 
ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein 
have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as 
amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or 
to Have Indiscriminate Effects. 
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit 
a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the 
deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to 
ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
   (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
   (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of 
all the anti-personnel mines; and 
   (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-
personnel mines in mined areas; 
  c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
  d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension. 
5.  The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration 
the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of 
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6.  Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance 
with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State 
Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the 
















International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek 
and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2.  Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information 
concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose 
undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological 
information for humanitarian purposes.
3.   Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and 
rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness 
programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, 
international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International 
Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance 
and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental 
organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations 
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with 
demining. 
5.  Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of 
stockpiled anti- personnel mines.
6.  Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance 
established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various 
means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national 
points of contact on mine clearance. 
7.  States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties 
or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in 
the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementa-
tion of the program;
  c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 e) Assistance to mine victims;
  f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the rel-
evant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the 
implementation of the program. 
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall 





1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon 
as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party on:
  a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
  b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its 
jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot 
numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
  c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to 
contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as 
possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined 
area and when they were emplaced;
  d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or 
transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine 
destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institu-
tions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance 
with Article 3; 
  e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine 
production facilities;
  f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with 
Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the 
location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to 
be observed; 
  g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of 
anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, 
if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in 
accordance with Article 4;
  h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent 
known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably 
possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of 
anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, 
explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may 
facilitate mine clearance; and
  i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in 
relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States 
Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year. 
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to 
the States Parties.
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of 
















2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, 
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter 
to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. 
Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken 
to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be 
unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 
next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the 
submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, 
to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which 
shall have the right to respond. 
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties 
concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her 
good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal 
and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a 
request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for 
the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such 
communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States 
Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of 
States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case 
may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all 
information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties 
or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by 
consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this 
decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the 
Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including 
any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting 
of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a 
majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite 
a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a 
Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a 
mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance 
with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places 
directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the 
requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the 
names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties 
and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded 
as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance 
in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact- finding 
missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting 
State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to 
such missions.
92 
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of 
the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with 
the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals 
of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be 
appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges 
and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.
11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the 
territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party 
shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the 
mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum 
extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding 
mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment 
which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. 
Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it 
intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission 
is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide 
information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas 
and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be 
expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State 
Party considers necessary for:
  a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
  b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have 
with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
  c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every 
reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention. 
15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no 
more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-
finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the 
results of its findings. 
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider 
all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may 
request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a 
specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response 
to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may 
suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the 
matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity 
with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due 
to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States 
Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, 
including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall 
make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, 

















Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including 
the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State 




1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that 
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State 
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by 
whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the 
States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and 
clarification of compliance.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the 
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention; 
  c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  d) The development of technologies to clear anti- 
personnel mines;
  e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent 
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until 
the first Review Conference. 
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to 
attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure. 
ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be 
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States 
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Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five 
years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties 
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11; 
  c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
  d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this 
Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 




1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose 
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated 
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views 
on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a 
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation 
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an 
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited 
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of 
Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States 
Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held 
earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of 
the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall 
communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this 
Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments 
of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any 
remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14 
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States 
Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the 
States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 
and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance 

















This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature 
at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the 
United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with 
the Depositary. 
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month 
in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been 
deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it 
will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.
ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw 
from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the 
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument 
of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six- month period, the 
withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect 
before the end of the armed conflict.
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4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the 








The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.

